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# A REVIEW OF ITALIAN MODERNISM

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The future historian of Modernism will be much embarrassed by the contradictory appreciations and misjudgments which are to be found in our contemporary literature on this subject. One book presents Modernism as a movement of the Latin mind, distrusting individualism and laying stress upon the corporate element in religion; another writer, on the contrary, characterizes Modernism as "a spirit of anarchy, of individualism, of personal distinction and culture." To some writers Modernism is the greatest spiritual movement ever produced inside the Catholic Church, while to others it is an insignificant and useless dream of a few not completely developed minds. Consequently some of them outline the development of Modernism as an anecdotic history without a real unity in purpose, while others conceive of it as of a system of theology derived from certain fixed and definite philosophic premises.

On the whole, little attention has been paid to the facts upon which the development of modernist ideas depends. Especially the history of Italian Modernism has been greatly miscalculated on account of this lack of appreciation of the historical ground and the environment in which the movement was born and developed. A com-

prehensive history of Modernism has not yet been written; but so far as it concerns Italy, only by going back to the history of the intellectual and moral life of the Italian clergy since the last quarter of the nineteenth century shall we be able to understand the true nature and the true spirit of Italian Modernism and to value its importance in the history of the Roman Church.

The fall of the temporal kingdom of the papacy completed Italy's political unity, but rendered for a time more difficult the achievement of the moral unity of the nation. The Catholic clergy, numerous, rich, and very influential with the populace, were of course openly hostile to the new régime, especially in the provinces of Southern Italy. Closely connected with the clergy was the great majority of the aristocracy — all the bishoprics and the highest ecclesiastical offices being filled with cadets of noble families; and this alliance between the Church and the highest social classes had shaped the customs of the ecclesiastical hierarchy into a peculiar aristocratic type. The new government, already struggling hard to overwhelm the divergent tendencies of the Italian provinces, so different among themselves in economic and moral standards, in traditions and interests of all kinds, had also to reckon with a clergy in open or covert hostility toward it.

Extreme measures were adopted. The Piedmontese law was passed by the national Parliament, abolishing religious orders and ecclesiastical benefices in no connection with cure of souls, and transferring all their estates to the public domain, with the purpose of establishing schools and other educational institutions in behalf of the people. It is interesting to notice that such a fierce blow to the Church was considered by many — and the best members of the clergy itself — as a punishment of God for the deep corruption of religious life in convents and parishes. In a book which belonged to

a Sicilian convent one of the friars, heart-broken, wrote before his leaving the convent forever, the following words:

"Manus Domini cecidit super nos; iniquitates nostrae supergressae sunt cacumina montium et nos facti sumus sicut filii maledictionis et irae. Semitas rectas non calcavimus et cum meretricibus panem nostrum comedimus. Aurum et argentum, ingluviem et voluptates, dileximus nimis; propterea Dominus oblitus est nostri, derelinquens nos in potestate inimici. Justum est judicium tuum Domine. Amen."

The first effect of the abolition of the religious orders was the breaking of the link of interests that had bound the aristocracy to the Church. There were many convents in Italy reserved exclusively for the members of the aristocracy. It was impossible to be accepted as a monk (to live the life of humility and penitence!) in those convents unless a title of nobility could be shown. Those places were veritable *vivaria* for bishops and high prelates, who were supposed to be educated and trained through the hard trials of monastic discipline. But in fact life in those convents was easy, and this ecclesiastical aristocracy remained feudal in its spirit and oppressive in its forms; excessively proud of ancestors and titles, by which they believed themselves to bestow honor upon the ecclesiastical offices instead of being honored by them.

Extremely jealous of their prerogatives, those bishops of noble families transformed their residences into little courts, with all the rigid ceremonial of Spanish aristocracy, the same extravagant display of servants and liveries, besides a complicated system of kneeling down and bowing and hand-kissing, to which more or less valuable indulgences were attached. But as soon as the Church lost its temporal power, and the alliance between the throne and the altar was dissolved, the aristocracy deserted the Church party, so that today very few members

of that class are to be found on the list of Italian bishops and prelates. Even the pontifical diplomatic body, until a few years ago exclusively reserved for the ecclesiastical aristocracy, is now contaminated with many upstarts from the lower classes. This progressive disappearance of the aristocracy from the ranks of the Italian clergy is to be considered as an important fact in connection with the new mentality of the clergy of the next period.

The withdrawal of the aristocracy was, for various reasons, gradually imitated by the well-to-do people, and today the Italian clergy is almost entirely recruited from the rural classes. One of these reasons — which is of capital importance in preparing the basis of the Modernism to come — was the action of the government in taking over the administration of public schools and public education and freeing it from clerical interference. During the old régime there were two kinds of educational institutions: the *Seminaria clericorum*, one in each diocese, under the control of the bishop, and the *Colleges* of the Jesuits or of other religious orders. The teachers were all members of the secular or the regular clergy, and even the universities were under the direct or indirect control of the Church.

The new government secularized the universities, even abolishing theological Faculties, closed all the Colleges of the religious orders and reduced the *Seminaria* to the condition of private institutions, whose diplomas were deprived of any value as titles for admission to public offices or public liberal professions. The *Seminaria*, though established by the Council of Trent for the education of the clergy, had been for a long time institutions of a broader scope. In the absence of other secondary schools, most young men desiring to enter a liberal profession there received their classical and philosophical education, so that clergy and laymen had

the same mental training without divergence in their spiritual culture. The new law on public education cut off such a connection. While the public schools under the new régime of liberty were open to all modern ideas and scientific methods, the *Seminaria* not only stood by their old methods, but through an inevitable reaction against the irreligious spirit of the public schools became even more conservative, thus fixing an enormous gulf between the mentality of the new clergy of the *Seminaria* and the young laymen growing up in the public schools. This breaking of relations between the ecclesiastical and the lay culture is another mile-stone in the history of Italian Modernism.

The Italian clergy that came up in the difficult years between 1870 and 1880 developed a higher moral standard under adversity than their predecessors. A kind of ascetic renaissance was visible among the young priests, monks, and friars. These last were trying under enormous difficulties, in the face of poverty and the open hostility of the law, to reorganize their religious families from the foundations. Many members of this young clergy found a compensation for the lost influence in public education, in work of a social-charitable character. Some of them were very successful in establishing orphanages, hospitals, and asylums for old people unable to work. Don Giovanni Bosco in Turin, Fr. Ludovico da Casoria in Naples, Don Giacomo Cusumano in Palermo, were three very remarkable men who founded, besides numerous charitable institutions, the religious congregations of *Salesiani*, *Frati Bigi*, and *Boccone del Povero*, for the assistance and the education of the people whom they had gathered in their asylums.

But the rise of the moral level of the younger Italian clergy was accompanied by a decline of interest in culture. All participation in the political life of the nation had been severely forbidden to the clergy, and in general

to all Italian Catholics, by Pope Pius IX. The young clergy faithfully followed these pontifical instructions, while many rebels were to be found among the ranks of the older clergy. It seems strange that those young Italian priests and friars should have been more conservative than their older brothers educated in the revolutionary period; but it was logical enough. An unbroken tradition of liberalism has never failed to have some — and valiant — representatives among the Italian clergy. Even in the worst periods of decadence there were among them high-minded persons, who not only did not share the retrogressive spirit of their environment but anticipated their time, and in their writings outlined some of the modern religious views. During the nineteenth century, Gioberti (*La Riforma Cattolica*), Rosmini (*Le Sette Piaghe della Chiesa*), Lambruschini (*Lettere*), Curci (*Il Vaticano Regio*), to quote only the most famous names, were splendid illustrations of the everlasting vitality among the Italian clergy of a spirit of liberty and of reaction against the oppression of minds and of consciences. In the revolutionary period, during the hard and long struggle for national independence, many liberal priests and friars gave their life or their best activity for the patriotic cause.

When the war was over, this liberal clergy was rewarded by the government with good positions, either in public schools or in ecclesiastical offices dependent upon civil authority. But for the same reason they were very unwelcome at the Vatican, which did not dare to molest them for fear of complications with the government, but constantly barred them from any higher ecclesiastical offices, like the bishoprics, and above all from the teaching staff of seminaries and other ecclesiastical schools. The new clergy had been thus educated by the most conservative element, and had been taught that Garibaldi was a brigand, Cavour a cheat, Victor Emmanuel an ex-

communicated king, that the new kingdom was ephemeral, and that in a few years the old régime would be completely restored. Their knowledge of the history of the Church was limited to a general outline presented by some compilations lacking not only scientific spirit but even common sense. In many seminaries, especially of Southern Italy, Church history was not taught at all. Most of these theological schools had only three courses: dogmatic theology, moral theology, and elementary ecclesiastical law—no history, no biblical studies, not even the reading of the Bible itself. Hundreds of students of these schools reached the priesthood without knowing the names of the books of the Old and the New Testament.

The philosophical education of that clergy was not very conspicuous. The text-book adopted in many seminaries was a compilation by the Oratorian priest Valla, a strange mixture of Cartesianism and theology. The reconciliation between empiricism in dialectic, innatism in theodicy, and dualism in psychology — between that Cartesianism and Catholic dogma defined in scholastic terms, was reached through a series of compromises which certainly did not offer a very solid base for a systematic theology. Here was a real danger, of which most of those ecclesiastical teachers were, for lack of scientific training, unaware. The result was that the few men among the Italian clergy with a true philosophical mind who tried to find a reconciliation between faith and philosophy lost their faith, becoming either skeptics like Ausonio Franchi or positivists like Roberto Ardigo. In the meanwhile, the storm of Positivism had broken over Italian Universities. It was supported by men of great authority, like Siciliani, Lombroso, Angiullo, Corleo, and especially the former priest just mentioned, R. Ardigo. Positivism became the philosophy of the day, taking also the character of a strong protest against

clericalism and the Church of Rome. Thus politics and philosophy were united in the effort to minimize the power of the Church, accused, as it was, of obscurantism and suspected of continuous machinations to destroy the unity of the young kingdom. So between the mental attitude of the clergy and that of the cultured classes the gulf became wider. No reconciliation was possible between reactionary clericalism and irreligious positivism; both dogmatic, both intolerant; the former holding firmly to the Syllabus of Pius IX, the latter to the new gospel of Haeckel and Moleschott.

From 1880 to 1890 things changed a great deal. Leo XIII began his pontificate with a definite programme —the restoration of the temporal and the spiritual authority of the papacy. First of all, a strong centralization of clerical powers was necessary. Conditions were extremely favorable. The new clergy had been educated to belief in the dogma of infallibility. Furthermore, the Italian revolution, in breaking the bond between the Church and the State and depriving the Church of many privileges, gave up many of the rights of the State in ecclesiastical matters which had been based on the old concordats between the Roman Curia and the former Italian princes. Thus the Church acquired a free hand in the appointment of bishops. Under the old régime, with most of the Italian bishoprics under the *Jus patronatus* of princes and kings, prelates who received their appointment from the civil authority were likely to be more devoted to the interests of the dynasties than to the interests of the papacy, and not infrequently the bishops took a haughty attitude, almost of rebellion, against the popes.

When Leo was elected, the Italian bishops were more closely united to the papal See than ever in the history of the papacy. This unity of discipline, however, was to be strengthened by a closer moral and

intellectual unity. Leo wanted a clergy unified in aims and will with him, so as to be not only a docile but also an intelligent instrument for the realization of his plan. The first step towards this unification was the imposition of scholastic philosophy as the only philosophy to be accepted and professed by the clergy.

Pope Leo was obeyed. In a few years all the teachers of philosophy and theology in Italian seminaries threw away their Cartesianism, and the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas became the new gospel of the clerical schools. The Pope knew well how to keep alive the enthusiasm for the official philosophy of the Vatican by appointing into the cardinalate three or four among the most fervent Thomists and filling the staffs of pontifical universities and other clerical schools with their followers. Unknown men in a few years reached the top of the Roman hierarchy, only on account of some mediocre handbook of scholastic philosophy or some volume of *Theologia dogmatica ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis.* Thus every Italian seminarist learned that it was possible to find a red hat among the pages of the *Summa Theologica.*

Certainly in comparison with the indecision of the philosophy of the preceding period, the scholastic method seemed to be a strong mental discipline, a kind of intellectual gymnastic; but it was rather a gymnastic of formulas than of thoughts and ideas. The hunting of fallacies was the most important part of the game in those schoolrooms, and when the fallacy was found and the syllogism built in accordance with the rules upon ingenious distinctions and subdistinctions, then the work was done, and students were as proud as an entomologist who, having caught a rare insect, fixes it in his box in the right place required by a rigorous classification. And what else was philosophy for those young students but a box in which to fix the truth with a pin, according to a dogmatic classification? Before the philosophic

problems brought up by the new renaissance of idealism, which in this period drove out positivism from Italian universities, the neo-scholastic philosophy, as it was taught in ecclesiastical schools, remained imperturbable. A few words in their handbooks were enough to dismiss Kant, Hegel, and the others. Generally such systems were characterized as "*somnia dementium*," and the moral value of modern philosophy was summarized in a pious quotation: "*Deus quos vult perdere dementat.*"

The intellectual unification of the Italian clergy was thus achieved. Pope Leo then went a step further; he wanted Italian Catholics organized in a strongly disciplined political party. While securing political alliances at large, urging Catholics in France to rally to the Republic and in Germany to the central Prussian monarchy, Leo did not forget that the key of the position was at home; the restoration of the papal kingdom was to be principally founded on the feelings of the Italian people. A Catholic majority was to be organized and politically educated under pontifical directions. The policy of abstentionism that had been the *credo* of Italian Catholics, expressed in the words, "Neither electing nor elected," was slightly modified: "Organize to become both when the time is ripe." The motto of the clergy had been, "Far from public affairs!"; the new motto was, "*Fuori di sacrestia* — Out from the sacristy!" Thus under the control of the Vatican, the *Opera dei Congressi* was organized and rapidly spread in all the Italian provinces, with a large system of *Comitati diocesani* (diocesan committees) and *Comitati parrocchiali* (parish committees). The immediate purpose of this organization of Catholic forces on a uniform scheme was the gradual conquest of public powers.

Young priests and friars in their enthusiasm for proselytism began to spread their ideas through conferences, lectures, newspapers, and magazines; having confidence

in themselves and in the righteousness of their cause, they were inspired by the generous desire of enlightening the entire world. They were men of good will. Their teachers had taught them, that "beyond St. Thomas there was but the immediate vision of God, and outside the Roman Church there is no salvation"; therefore they felt it their duty to bring the world to St. Thomas and to the Roman Church.

In the meanwhile, Italian bishops thought of another conquest — public schools. Italian law does not bar any man — even a priest — graduated from an Italian Royal University from being appointed, after regular examination, to teach in the public schools. As in most of the Italian dioceses priests were more numerous than needed by the religious life of the people, many bishops thought that there was a good opportunity to send intelligent young priests to follow the regular courses in the Royal Universities, in order to graduate and fill positions in public schools. Thus they intended through these priests to acquire an indirect control over public education. It cannot be denied that the general plan outlined by Pope Leo was imposing and clever; but its execution was confided almost entirely to the Italian clergy, supported in the beginning only by a few laymen belonging to the cultured classes, or rather to the old aristocracy remaining faithful to the Vatican. Pope Leo had great confidence that his clergy, educated in clerical seminaries far from worldly interferences and thoroughly fed with scholastic philosophy, was well fitted and ready for the hard task to be accomplished. Was he justified in his confidence? The history of the papacy never registered a more complete and miserable failure of a pontifical programme of religious and political restoration.

The last twelve years (1890–1902) of the pontificate of Leo XIII saw the blossoming of all this long-prepared activity. The Italian clergy, in spite of the uniformity

in the educational methods of the clerical seminaries, was far from homogeneous; various groups were to be distinguished. To the first belonged many priests neither intelligent nor ambitious, who had no farther aspiration than parish work as assistants in some village or country town, where they might live peacefully between a religious service in the morning and a game of cards in the drug store with old friends in the evening. Others, ambitious and intelligent, were desirous to make a career. They knew by tradition that frequently in the church true merit is not rewarded and that true culture is not always the best way for a rapid career. They became easily familiar with intrigues and learned thoroughly the way of acquiring valuable connections; but either they did not care to go beyond that external and apparent culture which hides the interior poverty and the wide desert of the soul, or they put their culture at the service of their ambition, thinking — or feigning to think — with the brains of their ecclesiastical superiors. Obviously these groups were conservative in their tendencies and were closely united to the old-fashioned clergy in their stubborn opposition to every innovation in the Church.

But there were two other groups whose mental attitude, shaped in a different way, was anxious to find new lines of activity in their ministerial work. The first of them and the more numerous involved a considerable number of young priests deeply sincere in their desire to devote their life to the service of people; priests who, either for lack of mental training or on account of natural tendencies, preferred to scientific work in schools and libraries a practical work in social fields or in religious administration. The other group, smaller in number but very remarkable in quality, consisted of some intelligent young priests ready to devote themselves not only to the duties of ecclesiastical offices but also to religious

scientific work, with a pure, sincere desire to serve truth and goodness in the Church of Christ for the progress of mankind.

All these priests, sincere and insincere, intelligent and unintelligent, under the impulse of the papal voice came out from the sacristies and began their work in the world. It did not take long for many of them to feel their unpreparedness to meet a conflict with modern thought and modern social organization. They became aware that their language was not understood, and that they themselves were unable to understand the language of the world. The new Catholic organization found arrayed against it not only the old liberalism of freemasonry but also the young and already vigorous Socialist party, revolutionary and anti-religious in spirit. In the logomachies of the schools these young priests had been told that Socialism was but a Utopia, a theory which was going to be dissolved as soon as it came in contact with reality. Instead, they found that Socialism was already a strong political party, well organized through all Italy and rapidly spreading among the rural classes, in towns and villages till then considered the strongholds of Catholicism. Even greater was their disappointment in the realm of learning. They believed that their philosophy and their history were the only ones in the world, and they found that there was something else besides their knowledge, something that must be taken seriously and could not be dismissed with a single gesture of contempt.

In the following events we have to distinguish two different movements, which frequently are connected but never to be identified as they have been in the history of Italian Modernism—the politico-social movement, commonly known as *Democrazia cristiana*, and the religious scientific movement, to which the name of Modernism is especially applied. The first—*Demo-*

*crazia cristiana*—was started not only with the consent of the Vatican but even under its impulsion, and for some time developed under its direction; the second —Modernism—arose from the natural development of minds and consciences, not without the impulse of foreign influences, beyond, or rather against, the will and the intentions of the Vatican. It would be untrue to say that the second exerted a great influence on the first; strange as it may seem, it was rather the first which favored the development of the second.

The attempt to organize Italian Catholics on a political basis brought them into a close struggle with Socialism. A number of economic institutions, such as rural banks, coöperative stores, workingmen's leagues, rural coöperative associations, all strictly sectarian, were rapidly organized by the Catholics, who in a couple of years acquired through them a large body of clients and supporters, especially in rural districts. But Socialism was not only a political organization; it was also a doctrine, which on account of its appeal for a radical solution of the problem of poverty, was enthusiastically accepted by the lower classes. For the new Social-Catholic party it was comparatively easy to oppose Socialist institutions with other institutions, banks with new banks, and leagues with new leagues. But could they oppose to the Socialist doctrine an equally inviting doctrine, something more efficacious than the much-abused idea of Christian charity? The people wanted justice and no longer charity. Was there room for a true democracy in a Catholic society? At this point, quarrels began. The old conservative party of the *Opera dei Congressi*, prelates and aristocrats in touch with the Vatican, who wanted only an organization of electors faithfully obeying orders, did not understand why the young Catholics desired a democracy which would almost adopt the language and methods of the

enemy—the Socialists. Day by day the quarrels grew, until this disagreement became a serious danger to the vitality of the Catholic party itself. Both parties appealed to the Pope.

Leo XIII had lived in the expectation of international complications in European politics, from which he expected the opportunity for the restoration of his temporal kingdom. All his political activity had been a long preparation for that event, but by little and little he was realizing that his hopes were ill founded and that the development of that policy was too slow, while his life was near the end. He was anxious to accomplish something great in that direction before his death, and with his characteristic obstinacy and his decided will, he resolved to run the chance offered by the democratic tendencies of the young Catholic element. Moreover he was afraid of the Socialist propaganda that was daily gaining ground, and he was intelligent enough to understand that against organized Socialism, the work of the old leaders of the *Opera dei Congressi*, with its molly-coddlish and microcephalous aristocrats, was useless and inefficacious. Thus "Christian Democracy" was christened, and the Encyclical "*Rerum novarum*" was its Magna Charta. Leo XIII liked to act for effect; to make "*un bel gesto*" from time to time was one of his weaknesses; but we have to recognize that almost always he chose the opportune moment. The Encyclical "*Rerum novarum*," besides its positive value and its special purpose, was a very remarkable "*bel gesto*," intended to prove to all the world that modern tendencies in social politics are not in opposition with the ideals and tendencies of the Church of Rome; that on the contrary, they find in that very Church their strongest support and their wisest leadership when the time is ripe for them.

This formal acknowledgment of the *Democrazia cristiana* on the part of the Pope was astonishing, es-

pecially as coming from a man of his age, of his aristocratic tendencies, and up to a certain point influenced by the Vatican environment. There are two reasons which explain how it was possible for a Pope like Leo to recognize the legitimacy of a democracy. First, he believed that he could control such a democracy, relying too much on the consciousness of his personal ascendency and of the authority of his will and his words upon Italian Catholics. In the second place, the idea of democracy which Leo cherished and practically desired was something different from what we call democracy. He wanted a democracy blindly obedient to the papal direction. He did not realize that it was merely a paradox to try to organize a democracy with a social, economic, and political programme of its own, and at the same time to keep such a democracy under the strict control of an irresponsible and infallible authority. Christian democracy as outlined by Leo was based on a misconception. It was not a Christian but a papal democracy that Leo wished, and he did not remember that while the papacy is synonymous with the divine autocratic will, democracy is synonymous with the people's changeable mind; he did not understand that papal democracy was a contradiction in terms, and that no reconciliation on that basis was possible. He thought that a few concessions (more apparent than substantial) would be enough to satisfy the popular demand of the new Catholic democracy, and felt that it was a good bargain at that price to buy its support and its faithfulness for the development of his plan of political restoration. Very early this contradiction of principles was strongly felt in practice, and Christian democracy in its logical development disregarded papal directions, and more and more loudly advanced its claims for the liberty of fixing by itself its limits and its methods.

Was that Modernism? If it was, nobody was responsible for it but Pope Leo himself. Christian democrats, however, were not Modernists in the actual meaning of the word. Murri himself, the leader of the movement, remained faithful to his scholastic philosophy almost to the day when, excommunicated by the Church and defamed by clericals, he jumped to the extreme radicalism of his later career. They were not Modernists; but certainly they were no longer as their teachers had moulded them in the shade of clerical seminaries. They had changed a great deal; their activity in economic organizations, their political connections, their daily struggle against conservatives and socialists at once, their participation in public offices, had developed eminently in them the spirit of initiative, of self-confidence, and had given them a more dignified idea of their rights and their duties. They were no longer men who could be brought to act by imposing upon them in the name of obedience; they were already men for whom obedience had to be regulated by reason and conscience, and not reason and conscience by obedience.

By and by the Pope understood that instead of a democracy adapting itself to Christianity in conformity with the interest of the papacy, he had favored a democracy which was going to adapt to itself the Christian ideals as against the papal interests. The terms were reversed, and Leo, discovering that a democracy, even a Christian democracy, is not so easily governed as an order of friars, realized that the *Democrazia cristiana*, far from paving the way to a restoration of the temporal power, was becoming itself the greatest stumbling-block for any future attempt in that direction. In the last years of his pontificate, Pope Leo took several steps backward, but he did not pronounce the definitive condemnation of democracy. It would have been a public confession of failure, and he was too much possessed

by the consciousness of his infallibility, even in things having no connection with faith and dogma. Nevertheless, at his death everything was ready for the execution of Christian democracy; in regard to that Pius X was but the testamentary trustee of Leo XIII.

The social movement of Christian democracy was undoubtedly accompanied by a gradual development of new tendencies in connection with religious and spiritual life. The attempt to harmonize Catholicism and democracy necessarily brought minds to consider the problem of the nature and the constitution of the Church from a point of view different from the traditional one taught in clerical schools. Certainly not all of those young priests were much worried about it. The happiest men in the world when Christian democracy was read out of the Church were the young priests anxious to make a career. They had been working in the direction of democracy very unwillingly and only because it was the will of the Pope; but they were longing to return to their peaceful life of the sacristy, to their delicate intrigues of confessional and cure, to their miserable competitions for offices, distinctions, and wealthy benefices. For them no problem existed except their career. Many others who had no serious mental preparation for theoretical questions considered the problem in a practical way, reducing it to its simplest terms. Why, they asked, is there this contradiction between the spirit of Christianity and the spirit of democracy? A superficial inquiry led them to the dangerous distinction between religion and church, between Christianity and Catholicism. Farther with that analysis they did not dare to go. They remained faithful to the Roman Church. But something was dead in their souls—their enthusiasm. They lost the energy that comes from a faith backed by strong conviction, and though fulfilling their duty, they could not forget the dream of their first years of

priesthood. Their doubt was not strong enough to conquer their faith, but their faith was not living enough to give them peace of conscience.

The last group went through a different series of experiences. Many of them had attended and had been graduated from public universities, and had acquired a thorough knowledge of modern thought. They realized that the history of the Church could be judged from a different point of view from that of a divine revelation. "Does the history of the Church justify the postulate of a divine revelation?" It was the first fundamental question. They found that it was denied by modern thought, and in the old armory of the classical apologetic, they did not find a good weapon to oppose to such a denial, based, as it was, upon new historical ascertainment or new valuation of religious experiences. And again, "If the postulate of a divine revelation is not justified, does that mean that the Catholic Church is a useless institution, and that all the treasures of spiritual traditions and of spiritual life involved in its tradition and in its life must be thrown away like faded flowers?"

At this stage Italian Modernism was strongly influenced by French and English Modernism, and its further development is closely connected with the general history of the Modernist attempt for a reconciliation between Catholic faith and modern science. It is beyond the limits of this article to give even an outline of that history. It is to be observed, however, that among Italian Modernists there was a greater variety of mental attitudes and tendencies than among Modernists of other nationalities. This fact was due to the peculiar conditions of the Italian clergy. There were not among them men of such authority as Loisy and Tyrrell. Italian Modernists were almost all young men, belonging to the generation educated in seminaries from 1890 to 1900;

many of them were fresh from theological schools and universities. Among the priests of the preceding generation there were no Modernists. Some of them who, having a liberal mind, had left the Church, had become rationalists; in any case they were no longer interested in religious life and religious problems.

The tradition of the liberal Catholicism of Gioberti and Rosmini had been broken by the abolition of theological Faculties in public universities. There was no teaching of religious sciences of any kind in Italian public schools; therefore no opportunity was given to anyone to be interested in religious studies except in clerical seminaries, where nothing but doctrine "*ad mentem S. Thomae*" was allowed. Furthermore, French, German, and English Modernists were united in their resentment against what was called the "Italianization of the papacy." On this point some of the Italian Modernists were too much dominated by national feelings to approve with all their heart those anti-Italian tendencies.

The abandonment of the teaching of religious sciences in Royal Italian Universities accounts also for the small number of Italian Catholic laymen who became Modernists. It is true, however, that this small group contained very valuable men, who in the last period of Modernism showed for a while an unexpected vitality, especially through the famous review *Il Rinnovamento*. But it was too late, and their attempt was unsuccessful.

What became of Italian Modernism after the condemnation? The social-political movement of the *Democrazia cristiana*, embodied in its last stage in the *Lega Nazionale* of Romolo Murri, gradually took a more radical character, till it reached a programme of Christian Socialism and asked to be incorporated into the Socialist party as a distinct branch. But the Italian Socialists, not less intolerant than the Roman Curia, refused the

collaboration of the *Lega Nazionale*, which was afterwards dissolved.

The intellectual movement among the new clergy was checked. Modernism had not yet reached such a stage of maturity that it was dangerous for the Church to throttle it. Rather than a movement with a definite purpose, Modernism was still a tendency, a preparation for a movement. Some of these Modernists who had been converted to the Neo-Kantian philosophy found in the shadow of the practical reason a private solution of all contradiction between the ideal and the historical development of the Church. They are still members of the Roman Church, some even holding important offices in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and some teaching scholastic philosophy or theology *ad mentem S. Thomae* in clerical seminaries. Others were attracted by the Neo-Hegelian doctrines, then in great favor in Italian universities, and found in that philosophy their true and only religion. They left the Church, and many are today teaching classics or philosophy in public schools. Others, finally, took a different path. They were the followers of the philosophy of immanence, which Pius X in his Encyclical attributes to all the Modernists. The book of Blondel, *La philosophie de l'action*, had been the new gospel for their spiritual life. But they were not blind. They were aware that the path of immanence was not without danger. They understood that it was not very easy to harmonize the intellectual idea of the transcendent God of Catholicism with the subjectivism of the doctrine of immanence, as it was a hard task to reconcile the historicism of Loisy with the *a priorism* of faith and revelation. But after all, were they not justified in thinking that those logical oppositions could be transcended in the realm of practical activity, if upon those postulates it was possible to develop a new spiritual activity?

It was clear that this process was not itself a definitive solution, neither of the historical nor of the philosophical problem, but it was the only way through which most of the spiritual values of Catholicism could be preserved and utilized. Was it a compromise? But what solution of religious problem is not a compromise? Philosophers of idealism, whose philosophy is the only religion of their spirit, do they not live themselves in constant compromise between their theories and the practical philosophy of life, which is not at all their ideal philosophy but with which they have to reckon at any moment? Was it an illusion? But is it not through illusions and through audacious attempts that human progress moves towards the realization of a higher ideal? And for these ideals Italian Modernists faced the greatest sacrifices. They knew that they were spoiling their life. Young, intelligent, cultured, irreproachable in their public and private life, as Pius X himself attested in his Encyclical, they were highly gifted for the offices and dignities of the Church; but their love of truth was stronger than their ambition. They knew what was to follow; the examples of Lamennais, of Döllinger, of Loyson, and hundreds of others were present before their spirit. They knew that a condemnation was the irreparable issue of the movement, and that after a condemnation their names would remain forever engraved on the list of reprobates, in spite of repentances and apologies.

The Roman Church may forget all sins except the sin of thinking in a way different from its own. Monsignor Bonomelli never was a cardinal, though he deserved that dignity more than a hundred other Italian prelates. Monsignor Ireland never will obtain the red hat, in spite of his repentance and his later undemocratic utterances in favor of the temporal kingdom of the papacy. Modernists knew that, and they — the men accused by

the Pope of curiosity and pride as the sole source of their spiritual activity — they persisted in their attitude till the end came. Certainly, in their ranks there were many unprepared or inspired by less noble and pure reasons; there were even traitors among them. But every movement carries with itself evil as well as good, men of bad faith together with men of pure ideals. At any rate, the dead waters had begun to move, and in the movement was life, hope, resurrection. Their motto was "*laboremus*" —work for the intellectual and moral elevation of the clergy, of the people; work in all directions, scientific, social, political; work with the aim of reaching a higher and purer conception of religious life, not through philosophical speculation or theological subtleties but through righteousness and good will. They were not the representatives of a system of philosophy, they were not a sect, nor an organized body of reformers. Modernism was but a spiritual attitude, a strong faith and a vivid enthusiasm, trying to galvanize the dead religious spirit of the Italian people.

But the end came earlier than was expected. Was the Pope justified in condemning Modernism in all its forms and in all its manifestations? Certainly Pius X was logical; but do we not also call logical the German governor of Belgium who executed Miss Cavell, guilty of patriotism? *Summum jus, summa injuria.* Condemned and persecuted, what could Modernists do? They could but choose between two issues: either try to organize a new church in opposition to the Roman Curia, or, putting aside the idea of a collective activity, resolve individually the problem of their future life. The first way was impracticable. As I have said, Modernism was not of the nature of a sect; Modernists themselves were far from united on a common programme. Furthermore, they knew that their activity had not yet aroused a deep interest or an effective in-

fluence on the consciences of the Italian people. Old Liberals through their sectarian spirit, Radicals through diffidence, Socialists through their irreligious *a priorism*, the Government party through its tradition of compromises with the Vatican, the common people through their indifference, all through their spirit of hopeless skepticism, did not understand what Modernism was. They did not appreciate its spiritual value, and considered it as an unimportant new chapter of the history of theological quarrels; and, what was worse, the common people conceived of Modernism as a movement of young priests who, tired of their loneliness, wanted to take wives.

The individual solution was left. It became more urgent after the imposition of the papal oath against Modernism. There is hardly to be found in the history of the papacy an act of more refined cruelty than that oath urged upon thousands of young priests, guilty only of having minds of their own and of being sincere and loyal to their consciences. This was the last drop that made the cup run over. Many lost their only hope, and their faith in the Church was broken down forever. Some of them resigned their positions, left the Church, and are living with their Christian faith, as laymen, outside of every religious movement. They left their ranks after long hesitation and anguish of spirit, left their ecclesiastical life with the deepest regret and unforgettable sorrow, like one who leaves the beloved person to whom all the enthusiasm of youth was dedicated but with whom it is no longer possible to live, because in the house of adultery there is no more room for him. And they went through the world, sometimes despised, often underestimated, always struggling hard to make their living, because it is not easy and not even always possible for a man who begins his life anew at an age when he ought to be at the highest success, to find con-

genial work in conformity with his tendencies and his intellectual training.

Some others among the Modernists kept their places in the Catholic Church and in the ministry. They pronounced with their lips the oath that their souls refused, and they are living now in the Church in lower offices, in the shadow; they are the penitents praying under the porch, waiting the opening of the doors. They know that the reasons of the spirit are higher than all other reasons, but they could not free themselves. Men cannot live by logic, any more than by bread alone. They were called cowards and hypocrites; they were obliged to hide themselves, to keep silent, to bow before the idols of the Curia; and they are still there, waiting the day of resurrection and of light. It may be that their presence in the Church, even in the shadow and in scorn, is necessary. We do not dare to judge consciences so fiercely tested. We know that there are subtle shades of feeling with which we have to reckon in our spiritual as well as in our material life, and as we do not praise, neither do we condemn them.

However the Modernists resolved their spiritual problem, we own a deep sense of respect and sympathy for these men who knew the anguish of doubt and the joy of illusions, who so enthusiastically lived their faith, and for their faith and their spiritual liberty are suffering in the path of the world or in the shadow of the Church.

# AN ITALIAN MODERNIST'S HOPE FOR THE FUTURE

ROMOLO MURRI

The religious propaganda carried on in Italy by the Protestant churches has not, we must confess, yielded the results they presumably hoped for. It is not that they have achieved no practical result. Doubtless they have done good to scattered groups of believers. But the result has had no national importance. It has not been felt as a vital force in the world of Italian culture, nor as creating a spring of living, genuine religious feeling such as could exercise a noticeable influence on the further development of the religious consciousness of the country.

Nor have attempts at a religious revival originating within the country itself been more successful. The movements in favor of Liberal Catholicism, Christian Democracy, Modernism, important and vigorous as they were, seem to have passed by and to be over. They have left hardly any trace of having existed; in a sense the fact of their non-success has left matters rather worse than before.

Perhaps until now it has never been sufficiently realized how difficult is this question of a religious revival in Italy; the keenest observers have overlooked the difficulties. The saying of Erasmus, "*Itali omnes athei*," is just as true, and as false, as it was at the time of the Renaissance. But we might with almost equal truth say, "*Itali omnes clerici.*" No modern nation has had less of an inner religious life; and yet no modern people has a civil history so closely bound up with its religious

history. The civil history of Italy centres round the papacy; Italy was always either obeying or resisting her popes. While she obeyed them, she was also occupied in judging and criticising; we need only recall, among others, the names of Dante, Petrarch, and Savonarola. When she was fighting the papacy, she yet in her heart of hearts respected and loved it, only wishing to see it improved. To this rule there are only trifling exceptions; the papacy was felt to be an entirely Italian institution.

To put the matter in other words, the Italians have never viewed religion as a personal inner relationship between man and God; of this they have not been capable. They have never taken any real interest in efforts on behalf of religion when these seemed to them to be only of a limited and local kind. The idea of religion for them involves universality; its spirit must find a historical expression in symbols, ceremonies, and some instituted form of ecclesiastical authority.

We are not mentioning this as a point in their favor. No; we are fully conscious that it is this fact that has been a tremendous drawback in the national life. Owing to it, our country has been left behind in religious progress, to rank with Spain and Greece in this respect. Religious institutions, whatever they may become in the future, had to pass, after the Middle Ages, through a period of criticism, of inner development, of individualism and non-conformity. Italy has not yet definitely reached this period of development. The papacy is still strong enough today to maintain its position; it holds its own in spite of the vapid indifferentism which surrounds it. The most thankless task, the most wearisome and ill-fated, is that of trying to interest our fellow-countrymen in the problems of their moral and religious faith. Our appeal is everywhere met by that hypocritical spirit of opposition which is to be found all over Italy.

Will the war alter all this? If the truth must be told, we are bound to admit that, at least so far, the war has not stirred the hearts of the Italians to their depths, as it has in the other countries engaged. No; from first to last, the only noticeable feature has been the Catholic revival. It has been accompanied by the presence and the pomp of its chaplains and by an æsthetic form of mysticism of a Catholic type, whose high priest, Gabriele D' Annunzio, has hitherto been a writer of the fleshly school.

But the Italians are partly old in scepticism, partly ingenuous as children; and most of them have not as yet fully grasped the tragic gravity of the war upon which they have — so justly — entered. They are only beginning to realize the extent of the sacrifices it involves. They will not have learnt spiritual wisdom for some time yet; for they have still to meditate upon all the historical reasons for the war and to feel the burdens of those new and arduous duties that it brings.

But some change is beginning to make itself felt in rather less profound regions of thought. Our public life of yesterday, for instance, near as it is and far away as it already seems, is remembered by some with a keen sense of repulsion. They do not know what it will be tomorrow; they feel it cannot be as it was yesterday. And another sign of the times is that others — even those who were yesterday the most ardent upholders of external forms of civilization, those who fought for some cause connected with material progress — are now speaking of moral energies, spiritual values, and of faith. Much is also to be hoped from the present return to the living traditions of our nation, the liberation, that is, from foreign, and especially from German, influences, which have been with us too long, and marred our national genius.

At the end of the war there will therefore in all probability be an excellent opportunity, but a brief and fleeting one, for attempts at a national religious revival that may be lasting.

But we shall have to keep clear of the errors of the past. We shall still have to face the Italian instinctive dislike of narrow religious movements and small religious bodies. This feeling is too deeply rooted in our national culture for it to disappear altogether. Italian Catholics will still cling to the forms and symbols of their Church — that which comprises so much that is human history and at the same time is a compendium of so much of our national history. There will be no interest or attraction for cultured Italians in a movement where they find no germ of a new spiritual and religious synthesis such as may embrace all humanity while including and absorbing the religious forms of the past. The last great Italian in whom we have the expression of Italian religious feeling was, though he stood outside the older Churches, Giuseppe Mazzini, preacher of a God whose worshippers have still to be found. It is we who were the first to call for a return to his faith, proclaiming him not as a republican or a conspirator or a patriot, but as a soul deeply, intensely imbued with the religious spirit.

For the future, therefore, I see only two possible forms of practical religious effort. The first is a liberal form of Catholicism, which while it would be excommunicated by the Pope, would not respond by excommunicating him; while not actually denying anything in the old Catholicism, it would permit of its free development. This is the Modernist idea as it has existed from the time of Lambruschini and Gioberti down to today. The second form would be a religious movement for cultured minds, and would judge of things strictly by their essential spiritual value. It would be Unitarian, and,

not so much because it tended to polemics as because it would keep an open mind, its attitude would be critical.

Educative as regards spiritual liberty, it would be able to embrace all forms of faith by rising above them to a new synthesis; from this point of view, such forms are seen to be stepping-stones, stages, means of development in one great faith, a faith which accepts the idea of the unity of the world, and of the world's history under the guidance of God, and takes its stand on the spiritual value of things.

If the Italians are more inclined, after the war, to accept both of these movements, they will find that they have not strength to carry them out. Individual initiative is as yet too weak; it hardly exists as far as religious subjects are concerned. The coalition against the innovators is also too strong.

As regards culture and the religious studies which would be necessary to prepare any religious revival, students are lacking. Against similar studies the Church sets her face; and the State, being afraid of getting wrong with theology, has suppressed every kind of scientific teaching of philosophy, or of the history of religion, in the lycées and universities.

This state of things, the tendency of Italians to seek religious satisfaction in those forms which have historic or cultural and universal importance and value, ought to induce other nations in whom the religious sense is keener, to interest themselves more and with increased judgment and discernment, in the state of religious thought in Italy. We ought to provide ourselves with all that is necessary to make war on mediæval ecclesiasticism in Rome, the centre of this religious thought. As far as one can see, Rome is intended to be the seat of a new spirit of universal religion which shall take the place of the old, and have the power to assert itself and

triumph over the present mechanical, formal civilization. The first thing to be done is to provide books, lectures, and clubs of religious culture, and if it were possible, to found a free university of religious studies in Rome. All these things would lead Italians to value that spirit of liberty which should be the foundation and the guiding rule of all research and of all true religious life. The scientific study of religion ought to be revived in Italy. We ought to get into touch with the more living centres of religious activity, specially in England and America.

These are the main lines of our programme. On these lines we hope to work when the war is over. But this can only be done as far as we are enabled to do so by the help and collaboration we find in other countries outside Italy.

# THE "SON" AS ORGAN OF REVELATION

BENJAMIN W. BACON

Among the most notable contributions of recent years by classical philologians to New Testament interpretation is E. Norden's *Agnostos Theos* (Berlin, 1913), a comparison of the Lukan account of Paul's missionary career and preaching with Hellenistic parallels, more particularly the biography by Philostratus of Apollonius of Tyana. As a further example of the same method of literary parallels Norden appends a discussion in the last chapter of this book (Schlussbetrachtung, pp. 277–308) of the famous *logion*, or saying of Jesus, from the Second Source (Q) on the Son's Knowing the Father and being Known of Him (Mt. 11 25–30 = Lk. 10 21–22).

Parallels from Hellenistic literature put the 'Johannine passage' in a new light. We recognize it in any event as a fragment; for the antecedent of ταῦτα ("these things") is wanting both in Matthew and Luke. But Norden proves it lyric poetry. Its opening clause "I thank thee, Father" (ἐξομολογούμαι σοι, πάτερ) leads him to designate it a hymn of thanksgiving for divine revelation. He divides it according to literary type into three strophes, each consisting of four corresponding lines:

I. *a* I thank thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth
*b* Because thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding
*c* And didst reveal them unto babes
*d* Yea, Father, for such was the Good-pleasure in thy sight.

II. *a* All things were revealed to me by my Father
*b* And none hath known the Son save the Father
*c* Neither hath any known the Father save the Son
*d* And he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him.

III. *a* Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden
*b* Take my yoke upon you and learn of me
*c* And ye shall find rest for your souls
*d* For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light.

Subject, contents, and rhythmic structure confirm Norden's judgment based on the opening words of the lyric, and the judgment receives further corroboration from the formula by which our third evangelist introduces it. The words ἠγαλλιάσατο τῷ πνεύματι ἁγίῳ are the substantial equivalent of those previously employed for lyric citations in Lk. 1 41–44 and 67, and might fairly be rendered "He broke into inspired song."

If the 'Johannine *logion*' is really a quoted hymn of thanksgiving for divine revelation belonging to a specific type of religious lyric, interpreters who thus far have been content merely to point out its general dependence in thought and phraseology on Ecclus. 50–51, will need to revise their judgments. At least the present writer, whose article entitled "Jesus the Son of God" in the *Harvard Theological Review* for July, 1909 (II, 3)[1] endeavored to interpret the *logion* "in harmony with the rest of Synoptic tradition," feels now a double obligation; first, to express deep indebtedness, second, to point out if possible how profoundly all questions of Christology are affected by the evidence connecting this most fundamental of all Christological passages with a whole series of kindred poems.

The Synoptic context of the *logion* (Mt. 11 20–24 = Lk. 10 13 f.) is an upbraiding of the unrepentant cities of Galilee. As pointed out in our former article, the evangelists seem to take the "wise and understanding" as meaning the Jewish scribes, boastful of their knowledge of God (Rom. 2 17–20). Wisdom's children, the "babes," are the repentant "little ones" of Galilee. The hidden mystery revealed to them is the true tradition of right religion, "all things" being used in the

[1] Subsequently republished under the same title in a volume of essays in Christology by the Yale University Press (1911).

sense "all truth." Since this right knowledge is accessible only to him who has the filial attitude and spirit, Jesus as the son (generic) can alone truly reveal the Father.

This interpretation fulfils at least the important requirement of relating a passage so unique in Synoptic literature as to have earned the designation "the Johannine passage"[2] to its Synoptic context. It at least looks toward the truth, and will be seen to coincide in important respects with Norden's. But the new developments reveal its inadequacy. The vital questions remain: What was the original application and meaning of the hymn? Is its 'Johannine' character and style to be explained by the currency of 'Johannine' *logia* of Jesus; or is it an erratic block, like the quotation from "the Wisdom of God" in Lk. 11 49–51; 13 34 f. = Mt. 23 34–39, representing a mode of thought and speech antecedent to the Johannine? In that case it is not the fourth Gospel which should be used to interpret the *logion*, but the *logion* and its connections which should be used to interpret the fourth Gospel. For the theme of the Johannine writer is no other than this same saving *gnosis* which comes to the world through the Son's revelation of the Father.

Apropos of literary affinities it will be remembered that the *logion* was shown to have connection with the *agraphon* "My mystery belongs to me and to the sons of my household"[3] as well as with Mk. 4 11, "To you is given the mystery," &c. It was further brought into parallelism with a number of Pauline passages including 1 Cor. 1 18–3 2, where we hear of the wisdom hidden by God in a mystery from the wise of the world but revealed through the Spirit of Christ.

[2] So *e.g.* in Schmiedel's article "Die Johanneische Stelle bei Matthäus und Lukas" in Prot. Monatshefte, IV (1900), 15 ff.

[3] Clem. Al. Strom. v, 10, 69. In Clem. Hom. xix, 20 it appears in the form "Keep the mysteries for me and the children of my household"; cf. Odes of Sol. viii. 11. Theodotion's rendering in Is. 24 16 was τὸ μυστήριόν μου ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς (Vlg., secretum meum mihi). This probably represents a pre-Christian targumic tradition the common source of all these variants.

What now remains to be shown (and can be shown with the aid of Norden's contribution) is that the fundamental connection of the *logion* with 'Johannine' conceptions is indirect. The common roots of both are in that mystical literature which we may designate Lyric Wisdom, whereof classic examples are to be found in the 'Songs' of Prov. 1 7–9 18, Ecclus. 24, Wisdom of Solomon entire, and Bar. 3 9–5 9. The material has recently been vastly enriched by the discovery of the so-called *Odes of Solomon*.

The fourth evangelist cannot, of course, have failed to know the *logion* as quoted by Matthew and Luke. But it is its spirit rather than its mere language which he reproduces, and for this deeper relation he cannot have been solely dependent on this single fragment of Q material. Light dawns when we discover the *logion* to be one of many hymns of Wisdom, whose common root is the idea of Israel as the People of Revelation. For (as stated in the article referred to) "To be the Son of God by knowing and doing his will is the Pharisee's ideal for his people." Indeed, however unique the terms 'Son' and 'Father' may sound in modern ears in this application, they are in reality the characteristic generalities of Lyric Wisdom. A series of Jewish parallels will disclose the facts; for the *logion* in its fundamental ideas, if not in actual composition, is certainly pre-Christian.

A preliminary look at certain contemporary pagan conceptions will be desirable; for the literature of theosophic mysticism exploited by Norden has much light to throw on the *logion*, as a typical utterance of the many "revealers of the Unknown Father."[4]

Plato himself willingly avowed dependence on the "revelations" of Orphic poets. Plutarch's search for "the oldest" religion shows the same wide-spread idea of an original divine revelation dissipated among the

[4] The phrase is typically Gnostic. Cf. Cerinthus, ap. Irenaeus, Haer. I, xxvi, 1, as quoted below.

world's many religions. The various mysteries and cults of the Empire were exploiting this idea to the utmost, as Reitzenstein and Cumont set forth. But Norden has told us very little of the Jewish adaptation of the idea. That it should be seized upon both in Palestine and Alexandria was inevitable. Nothing could be more congenial to the thought of this people, whose sole hope and distinction was its unique religious literature, than the ideal of Israel as mystagogue of the nations, the people of revelation, of *torah*, or, as the Greek would say, of *gnosis*. And this adoption has a vital bearing on the interpretation of the Q *logion*. Its key-words are the terms 'Son' and 'Father,' and while Norden has fully illustrated the employment of these in the literature of pagan mysticism he has passed over much that was at least equally instructive in the literature of contemporary Jewish mysticism. Thus in pagan mysticism 'Son' is the term for the recipient and transmitter of the revelation, the μύστης of the mystery religions. In Lyric Wisdom the Son is Israel, chosen as the predestined organ of divine revelation to the world. Israel is the world's hierophant, the Son that is "known" of God in order that he may make God known.

Two postulates are indispensable to right understanding of the facts. We take them respectively from Norden and from R. H. Charles.

(1) The *logion* is primarily concerned with the claim of the Son (*i.e.* in the evangelist's understanding, Jesus) to be the mouth-piece of divine revelation. It deals with the παράδοσις τῆς γνώσεως θεοῦ.

Norden's parallels are here decisive. He summarizes for example the typical Hermetic 'Thanksgiving' as follows:

"I believe and testify. Praise to thee, Father.
Thou transmittest to me, thy son, the whole fulness of thine authority.
For thou didst reveal thyself and thus becamest known.

This knowledge at thy command I transmit to my fellowmen who are worthy.
The unworthy harden themselves against it."[5]

The agreement of this schematic form with the *logion* is obvious, and the coincidence in substance is mutually illuminating.

(2) The title 'the Son' in Jewish literature is messianic, and like all the messianic titles, Servant, Son, Beloved, First-born, Only-begotten, Elect, Saint, Just One, &c., is of primary application to *Israel* collectively. *Israel* is the 'Son,' 'First-born,' &c., whom Jehovah elected to adoption and brought out of Egypt. The application to the Messiah, as representative of Israel, Jehovah's agent in accomplishing the national destiny, is secondary. This principle has been so clearly stated by R. H. Charles, and is so well established, that we may properly build upon it. As classical examples of the application to Israel of the particular titles First-born, Only-begotten, Beloved Son, we may refer to 2 Esdr. 6 58 and *Pirke Aboth*, iii, 19. On these titles and their significance more hereafter. We have first to consider the limits of our material.

It is gratifying to obtain the support of Norden against two such eminent authorities as Wellhausen and Harnack for the authenticity of the received text. On purely internal grounds Wellhausen had argued against the authenticity of clause *b* of Strophe II, "No man knoweth the Son save the Father." This he declared irrelevant and interrupting. Harnack had reenforced the objection[6] by citing a single variant, the Old Latin codex *a*, which in Luke (not in Matthew) has the reading: "Omnia mihi tradita sunt a patre, et nemo novit quis est pater nisi filius, et cuicumque voluerit filius revelavit." This unique variant of the Old Latin

[5] Op. cit., p. 293.

[6] Evang. Matthaei, Berlin, 1904, p. 57 f. Harnack, Sprüche u. Reden, p. 204. Per contra, Bacon, op. cit., § iv.

has the value of proving how the Western mind experienced in ancient times the same sense of interruption of the context which leads Wellhausen to reject the clause. But it has no other value, and in view of many parallels it will be apparent that the difficulty is with the Western mind and not with the text.

On the point of relevancy (which must be judged not from our point of view, but the writer's) the parallels are decisive. We may take first those already cited in the essay referred to as "examples from the Pauline writings (Gal. 4 9; 1 Cor. 13 12; 2 Tim. 2 19), which show what was the primitive treatment of the complementary principles of 'knowing' and 'being known of' God."[7] In Gal. 4 9 the same antithesis is employed concerning the Adoption of the Spirit. By it we come "to know God, *or rather to be known* of God." That is, the relation of sonship is not an acquisition of human wisdom, but an election, or adoption, a gracious admission by God into the confidential relations of His household. The verb to 'know' is used in this pregnant sense of 'recognize,' 'acknowledge,' in 1 Thess. 5 12, "We beseech you *to know* them that labor among you, and are over you." So in 1 Cor. 13 12 the ideal gift of *gnosis* is "to know *even as I have been known*." Previously in the same epistle (8 2 f.) we have a similar subordination of the 'knowledge' of God (γνῶσις θεοῦ) to the greater gift of 'love,' with the same contrast of the terms 'knowing' and 'being known' of God: "If any man seemeth to have attained 'knowledge' (ἐγνωκέναι) of anything, he hath not yet come to 'know' (ἔγνω) as he ought. But if any man *love* God the same *hath been 'known'* (ἔγνωσται = adopted into the relation of *familiaris*) by Him."[8]

To these Pauline parallels to the antithesis of 'knowing' and 'being known' of God a few may now be added which tend to show that the idea of adoption *vs. gnosis* is

[7] § IV. Knowing and Being Known of God. Reprint, p. 16.
[8] Cf. Lk. 7 47.

part of the general Jewish insistence upon its own divine Election (under the condition of obedience) over against heathen religion or philosophy. Thus the Pauline thought of 1 Cor. 8 2 f. is closely reproduced by the Johannine writer in 1 Jn. 4 7 ff. in protest against a doctrine of salvation by *gnosis* apart from obedience to the one 'new commandment': "Beloved, let us *love* one another, for *love* is of God, and everyone that *loveth* is 'begotten of God' and 'knoweth' God" (γινώσκει τὸν θεόν). Like Paul, moreover, this writer keenly emphasizes the *priority* of the divine Election: "Herein is the love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son, &c. . . . We 'know' and have believed the love which God hath in our case. God is love, and he that abideth in love abideth in God and God abideth in him. . . . We love because he *first* loved us." And this doctrine is not exclusively Johannine nor even exclusively Christian. Ode iii of the *Odes of Solomon* gives expression to the same thought on behalf of Israel, God's Beloved:

"On His members do I hang, and He loves me.
For I should not have known how to love the Lord if He had not loved me.
For who is able to distinguish love save the one that is loved?
I love the Beloved, and my soul loves Him."

And the odist adds, as if in express denial of the pretensions of heathen *gnosis:*

"This is the Spirit of the Lord which doth not lie.
Which teacheth the sons of men to know His ways.
Be wise and understanding and vigilant. Hallelujah."

The closing line has the typical exhortations of contemporary religious mysticism (σωφρονήσατε, νοήσατε, νήψατε); but Ode iv, 9 is perhaps closer still to 1 John:

"Thou hast given us thy fellowship.
It was not that thou wast in need of us, but that we are in need of thee."

Of the *Odes of Solomon* and their Jewish theme of Israel as the people of revelation, God's Chosen and Beloved, entrusted with his *torah* (*i.e.* 'teaching'), we shall have more to say presently. The Jewish mystic's affirmation is that the true *gnosis* rests solely on a divine Election in love by sovereign grace. With the destruction of Israel's political ambitions, and the substitution after the Exile of the Isaian ideals of the Servant bringing an evangelized world to the worship of Jehovah, the idea of the prerogative of Sonship necessarily underwent a change. The proof of it is found in Israel's special revelation, in written or unwritten *torah*, in the Spirit of the divine Wisdom abiding with the Servant, fitting him for his world-redemptive task.

From this age-long Jewish sense of Israel's divine prerogative, an adoption in love to be a revealer of the Father to a darkened world, springs both the Pauline and the Johannine *gnosis*. The relation of filial love—obedience to the new commandment—this and not purblind philosophy qualifies Jehovah's messenger. The Johannine point of view, like that of Paul which it reproduces, is therefore not merely Christian, but (in Jewish form) pre-Christian. It appears no less clearly in the Johannine Gospel than in the Epistle, as *e.g.* Jn. 15 11–15, where the confidential relation of the "friend who knoweth what his lord doeth"[9] is contrasted with the slave's. Here again election and obedience are the real theme. Moreover the succeeding verses (16 f.) emphasize as before the priority of the divine choice ("Ye did not choose me, but I chose you," &c.), and insist on the condition of obedience to the commandment of love (ver. 14, 17). Similarly in Jn. 8 31–59 the debate concerns the claim of the Jews to be Sons of God (ver. 41) by having knowledge of the truth (ver. 31 f.). Against this, as in Gal. 4 21–5 1, freedom and

[9] Cf. Sap. 7 27: "Wisdom . . . entering into holy souls makes men to be friends of God and prophets."

sonship are claimed for Christians only. They will "abide in the house" as true heirs of Abraham when the "bondslaves" are cast out. The claim of the Jews to be Abraham's sons is as false as their pretense never to have been in bondage. Their murderous purpose proves them sons of Satan and slaves of sin. The Johannine contention is that the election to sonship is through *gnosis;* but that this 'knowledge' is morally conditioned. The dialogue has indeed more real connection with the *logion* than Jn. 10 15, which Norden cites.

It recalls the protest of 2 Tim. 2 19 (a writing of the same region and period) against a similar non-moral *gnosis*. The Paulinist uses two complementary 'faithful sayings' as the 'seal' engraved on the foundation of God. The two-fold basis of God's building is: (1) divine election (2) human obedience. On the divine side: "The Lord 'knoweth' them that are his"; on the human: "He that nameth the name of the Lord, let him depart from iniquity." As against 'sons' who profess to 'reveal the unknown Father' by virtue of acquired *gnosis*, the 'Son' (whose good works support his claim) relies upon a divine election. None hath known (acknowledged) him save the Father who 'foreknew' and predestined him in His own eternal 'good-pleasure.'

But clause *b* of Strophe II also asserts on the negative side the world's ignoring of the bearers of divine revelation. In reality this is but another aspect of the familiar plaint of Wisdom at men's senseless refusal of her, a literary form as old as the prologue of Heraclitus. If Wisdom be spurned (as experience proves but too often the case), it can only be in the person of her exponents and representatives. Hence in Deutero-Isaiah and the kindred psalms of complaint of national ill-treatment, such as Ps. 22,[10] the Servant is both witness and martyr.

[10] For the close connection of this and kindred Psalms of Martyrdom with the Deutero-Isaian songs of the Suffering Servant, see Cheyne, The Prophecies of Isaiah (1884), II, pp. 202–204.

*Wisdom of Solomon* tinctures the Isaian figure of the Servant with colors borrowed from the persecuted "wise man" of Plato's *Republic* and the Stoic ideal Wise man who witnesses before an unheeding world. This plaint of Wisdom is a normal development in lyric Wisdom, including the *Odes of Solomon*, of the Isaian theme of the Servant "whom man despiseth, whom the nations abhor."[11] A typical Wisdom plaint is taken up in the form of a *logion* of Jesus in the Oxyrhynchus Fragment (*Log.* IV). Here it was originally Wisdom, but Wisdom incarnate in the person of the bearer (or bearers) of divine revelation, who complained:

> "I stood in the midst of the world
> And in the flesh was I seen of them[12]
> And I found all men drunken
> And none found I athirst.
>
> And my heart was grieved for the children of men
> Because they are blind in heart and see not,
> Poor, and know not their poverty."

The adoption of the plaint as a saying of Jesus is paralleled in the Wisdom plaint of Lk. 11 49–51; 13 34 f. = Mt. 23 34–39.

The world's ignoring of the messenger is likewise a theme of the *Odes of Solomon*, as for example xxx, 6, which says of "the fountain of the Lord":

> "It came infinitely and invisibly,
> And until it was set in the midst men did not know it."

To contemporary Jewish feeling, accordingly, the world's ignoring of the bearer of divine revelation is not irrelevant. On the contrary, it is complementary to the 'knowing' (*i.e.* admission to intimacy) of the Son by the

[11] Is. 49 7; 50 6; 53 3; cf. Sap. 2 12–3 9; and Odes xxviii and xxxi.

[12] Cf. Bar. 3 37 of the incarnation of Wisdom in Israel. The verse is suspected, though already quoted by Irenaeus. But no suspicion attaches to Sap. 6–9; 10 16, &c., where Wisdom "enters the soul" of Moses, Solomon, and other "friends of God and prophets," and makes Israel the chosen "Son" her abiding-place.

Father. The election in the 'good-pleasure' is expressed in the phrase of Am. 3 2, "You only have I known of all the families of the earth." Its complement is to be "despised and rejected of men."

From the period of Deuteronomy and Deutero-Isaiah the election, or adoption, of Israel is constantly declared to be for the purpose of extending *knowledge of the true God* to all the nations. The Servant was chosen and filled with Jehovah's Spirit for the purpose of 'witnessing' for Him, and "to bring forth true religion (*mishpât*) to the Gentiles" (Is. 42 1–4). He receives the title of Jehovah's "First-born," originally applied in a different sense (Ex. 4 22 f.), because of his adoption to this special function of 'witnessing,' and in view of his destination to be the Heir. This conception is chiefly developed as we might expect in the Wisdom literature. Indeed the later Jewish literature, both Alexandrian and Talmudic, takes this title of 'First-born' in a transcendental sense of predestination before the creation. Israel was *fore*-known before the foundation of the world and chosen from all eternity. The world was created on Israel's account, other nations being admitted to joint-heirship only as younger sons, and through Israel's mediation. It is in this sense that the *Odes of Solomon* claim not merely priority for Jehovah's chosen sanctuary of Zion before other sanctuaries, on the ground that He designed it "before He made places,"[13] but priority of origin for Israel over Gentile peoples. Israel is persecuted and hated in spite of its philanthropic mission to the Gentiles, but

"I did not perish, for I was not their brother nor was my birth like theirs,
And they sought for my death and did not find it; for I was older than the memorial of them.
And vainly did they make attack upon me and those who followed me.

[13] Ode iv, 1–4 and xxii, 12.

To no purpose they sought to destroy the memorial of him who was before them.
For the thought of the Most High cannot be forestalled
And His heart is superior to all cunning. Hallelujah." [14]

Moreover when Israel has fulfilled its mission of glorifying Jehovah before the world, He also will glorify them. Thus the 'knowing' of the Son is not merely as in *Psal. Sal.* xvii, 30, that Jehovah "takes knowledge of them that they be all the sons of their God," but this being 'known' becomes a formal acknowledgment in the presence even of angels. Thus in Jubilees 1 25,

"They all shall be called children of the living God and every angel and every spirit shall know, yea they shall know, that these are my children and that I am their Father, in uprightness and righteousness, and that I love them."

In Christian form this becomes a divine acknowledgment of "the adoption" in the presence of "the principalities and powers in the heavenly places." The eternal purpose of God is made known to these proud powers "through the church." In Rom. 8 15–21 the "manifestation of the sons of God" is the goal and dénouement of the creative mystery; earthly and supernal powers seek in vain to separate the "heirs" from the goal of His redeeming love.[15]

The need to vindicate the clause "No man knoweth the Son save the Father" as authentic has led us to anticipate. The parallels, Jewish and Christian, do more than prove its relevance. They show how the Jewish consciousness of higher religious insight had laid hold of the current mystic phraseology of *gnosis* to base upon it the claim to a national election, a sovereign act of the Creator's foreordaining love, a pre-creative divine *placuit* or good-pleasure (*rātsōn*, εὐδοκία). To the Jew this Son

[14] Ode xxviii, 14–18; cf. xli, 8 f.

[15] Rom. 8 33–39 employs Is. 50 8 f. With this compare Ode Sal. xxviii, 5 f. and Eph. 3 10 f.; 6 12; Col. 2 15.

who alone knows the Father is Israel, the people of revelation. Israel's *gnosis*, however, is not the wisdom of Gentile philosophy, but a gracious revelation bestowed by God on the 'beloved' people who though despised and ignored by the world are 'known' by Him as His 'witnesses.' For the revelation of the Father has its purpose. It is not for the Son alone, but for him also "to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him." As between Jew and Christian the question is only as to which exhibits that filial disposition which justifies a relation of "love."

But a further question still affects the limits of our material. Strophe III of the Ode (Mt. 11 29 f.) fails to appear in the Lukan parallel. It is that which Norden designates "The Appeal to Men," very properly adducing as parallels the exhortations of Wisdom in the Wisdom lyrics generally, but especially Ecclus. 51–52, and of the "pure virgin" in Ode xxxiii of the *Odes of Solomon*.

In § III of the Essay already referred to (p. 13) the present writer yielded to the more conservative critical judgment which excludes Strophe III from the common source (Q), mainly because grounds for its omission by Luke are difficult to define. Norden now advances strong reasons for regarding it as a genuine stanza of the hymn. This, however, is not decisive as to its having been contained in the Second Source, a fundamentally Christian writing. For if the poem be an excerpt from some unknown 'Wisdom' ode like the 'Wisdom' excerpt Mt. 23 34–39 = Lk. 11 49 f.; 13 34 f., it is quite conceivable that our first evangelist should have restored its missing stanza from the original (Jewish) source, just as Lk. 3 5 f. supplies from Is. 40 4 f. the remainder of the sentence given in truncated form by Mk. 1 3. But first as to authenticity.

Norden's division by *kola* and *kommata* is not arbitrary but is dictated by the sense, and Strophe III corre-

sponds in all respects with Strophes I and II. This symmetry of structure (*cf. e.g.* Ps. 23 in *Intern. Crit. Comm.* p. 207), and the fact that the coincidences with Ecclus. 51 cover not only Strophe III but also Strophe I (*cf.* Ecclus. 51 1–12 ἐξομολογήσομαί σοι, κύριε, βασιλεῦ, κτλ.), give irresistible evidence that Matthew's fuller form is the more authentic. This will be true whether Luke or the Second Source be responsible for the omission, a point on which Norden's opinion is difficult to make out. True, he says (p. 301):

> "The question whether Strophe III of the *logion*, which does not appear in Luke, belonged to the Q source, a question designated in the more recent discussions as still unsettled or unanswerable, is to be answered unconditionally in the affirmative."

But the only reason given is that

> "the appeal which it contains forms a stereotyped element of the literary model."

This argues for authenticity in the Ode, but not necessarily in Q; for Norden adds quite frankly, "I cannot say for what reason Luke omitted this portion of his source," and (as we have seen) it is quite supposable that Luke gives all that his immediate source — the Q source — contained, while Matthew's addition of Strophe III might be a restoration from the original (Jewish) Wisdom hymn.

The point of chief importance, however, is that the original hymn contained all three strophes, each containing four corresponding lines; for (as Norden's parallels show) the normal form of the Wisdom song of this type is three-fold: Strophe I, Thanksgiving for the Εὐδοκία; Strophe II, Reception of the γνῶσις; Strophe III, Appeal to Men.

But once we bring under consideration the Christian and pre-Christian parallels to these three elements of the

hymn, its original application *to Israel* as the People of Revelation becomes unmistakable.

The distinctive feature of the Jewish doctrine of election as understood in lyric Wisdom is the divine 'good-pleasure' and this it is which is celebrated in Strophe I (ὅτι οὕτως εὐδοκία ἐγένετο ἔμπροσθέν σου).

According to the Deuteronomist, Deutero-Isaiah, the Wisdom writers, and the later synagogue generally, this good-pleasure of God was, as we saw, an election of Israel to be the people of *torah*, *i.e.* the revelation of God embodied in the Law.

"This (says the Deuteronomist) is your wisdom, and your understanding in the sight of the peoples, that shall hear all these statutes and say, 'Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people.' For what great nation is there that hath a god so nigh unto them as Jehovah our God is whensoever we call upon him? And what great nation is there that hath statutes and ordinances so righteous as all this law, which I set before you this day?"[16]

The purpose of this choice of Israel and its endowment with *torah* is that all the ends of the earth may come to know Jehovah and to swear by His name. This people is designated His Servant; they are His 'witnesses' against the worshippers of idols, His 'messengers' to all far-off lands to proclaim the name and praise of the Maker of heaven and earth. This is the supreme message of Deutero-Isaiah. The chief difference between its development in the Wisdom literature (representing in the main the propaganda of Alexandria) and the Palestinian development under the scribes is that under the favoring auspices of Ptolemaic rule the Isaian ideal became liberal and *ex*-tensive, so that Israel's endowment was considered to be the living *Spirit* of the divine Wisdom, and Israel's calling the propagation of this *gnosis;* whereas in Palestine the bitter struggle against Hellenizing persecution compelled a more narrow and

[16] Dt. 4 6–8.

*in*-tensive development, Israel's endowment being defined as the *written* Torah, and its calling to 'witness' becoming primarily a calling to martyrdom.

On the particular point of the mystery of the meaning and purpose of the creation a parallel between two nearly contemporary documents, one Jewish, the other Christian, will show the nearness of the relation. We may follow it with a few from rabbinic sources and from lyric Wisdom:

*Assumptio Mosis* 1 12–14 (7–30 A.D.).

"The Lord of the world hath created the world on behalf of His people. But it was not His 'good-pleasure' to reveal this purpose of creation from the foundation of the world, in order that the Gentiles might thereby be convicted, yea to their own humiliation might by (conflicting) arguments convict one another. Accordingly He designed and devised me (Moses), and He prepared me before the foundation of the world that I should be the mediator of His covenant (of the Inheritance)."

1 Cor. 1 20–3 1 (in abstract).

"For seeing that in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew not God it was God's 'good-pleasure' to save believers through the foolishness of the preaching. . . . We speak God's wisdom in a mystery (revelation), even the hidden wisdom which God foreordained before the worlds unto our glory, which none of the (angelic) 'world rulers' hath known, but as it is written (quoting an unknown lyric source),

'Things which eye saw not and ear heard not
And which came not up into the heart of man,
Whatsoever things God prepared for those that love Him.'

But unto us God revealed them by the Spirit; for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God. . . . Which things also we (preachers) speak, not in words which man's wisdom teacheth, but the Spirit. . . . I spoke unto you as to 'babes' in Christ. I fed you with milk."

The literary affinity of 1 Cor. 1 18–3 1 with the Q *logion* has long been apparent, Pfleiderer and Harnack being among those who call attention to it. But the real point of connection is not with Q, where the application is to Jesus personally, but with the Hymn in its pre-Christian sense, where (as in Paul) God's *people* are the true hierophants as against the wisdom of "the (Gentile) world."

The doctrine that God created the world as an inheritance for his chosen and beloved people is, in fact, a commonplace of the later Jewish literature (*cf. e.g.* 2 Esdr. 6 55–58 and *Apoc. Bar.* xiv, 18 f.) which rests upon Gen. 1 24–26 and passes over into Christian teaching with a minimum of change (Rom. 4 13; 1 Cor. 3 22; Rev. 21 7; Hermas *Vis.* ii, 4 1 &c.). The *Assumptio Mosis*, as we see, boasts of the revelation of this secret to Moses over against the vain speculation of Gentile philosophers. Paul contends, however, that the Christian preacher possesses in 'the Spirit' the creative wisdom itself;[17] for this, to Paul, is "the mind of Christ" and it knows the purpose of God "even as the spirit of a man knows what is in him." Thus the Christian evangelist becomes the true mystagogue. He reveals to the world the secret purpose of creation—"even the things which God prepared for them that love Him." This mystery was hid from former generations (Rom. 16 25; Eph. 3 3–5, 9–11) and even from angels (*cf.* 1 Pt. 1 12 and *Slav. Enoch* xxiv, 3), but is now revealed to God's holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit, and is ministered by them as 'milk' to 'babes.'[18]

This is not mere self-exaltation on the part of Paul and his fellow-preachers. His quotation of an unknown "scripture" shows that he is simply appropri-

[17] Cf. in 2 Cor. 3 4–4 6 a similar comparison of the "ministry of the new covenant," and its revelation of the "*gnosis* of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ" with the revelation to Moses at Sinai.

[18] Cf. Odes of Sol. viii, 17; xxxv, 6, &c.

ating the religious function of Israel according to the flesh for "the Israel of God." Akiba the martyr-rabbi and founder of Talmudic Judaism scarcely more than a generation later shows us the common basis. He is vindicating Israel's claim to be the Elect People, the Beloved Son, against both Christian and pagan *gnosis*, and makes a characteristic appeal to Scripture. All men in a sense are God's 'sons' (Mal. 2 10). All can in a sense claim His 'love.' But Scripture discriminates. Only Israel, the people gifted with *torah* (revelation), is in the highest sense God's 'Beloved Son.' This is the substance of Akiba's condensed argument from Gen. 9 6, Dt. 14 1, and Prov. 4 2, as given in *Pirke Aboth* iii, 19:

> "Man is 'beloved' in that he was 'created in the image' (of God). But greater love is shown in the *revealing to him* that he was 'made in the image.' As it is said, 'In the image,' &c.
>
> "Israel are 'beloved' in that they are called 'sons of God.' But greater love is shown *in revealing to them* that they were called sons of God, as it is said, 'Sons are ye to the Lord your God,' &c.
>
> "Israel are 'beloved' in that to them was given the precious instrument wherewith the world was created (the divine Spirit of Wisdom). But greater love is shown *in revealing to them* that to them was given the precious instrument wherewith the world was created, as it is said, 'I have given you a good doctrine. Forsake ye not my *torah*,'" &c.

It is in the context of the last-named passage (Prov. 4 2 f.) that Akiba finds the titles 'Son' and 'Beloved,' which he claims in a unique sense for Israel, and claims them on the ground of revealed knowledge with particular reference to the creation. In Prov. 4 3 Israel is in fact addressed (by the divine Father according to Jewish interpretation) as 'Son,' and not only so but as God's "Beloved" and "Only-one" or "Only-begotten," as the Hebrew is rendered in the related passage 2 Esdr. 6 58.

We are here at the point of coincidence between Alexandrian Wisdom and rabbinic Judaism. For both these the election of Israel is an election to be the people of *torah*, their predestined function is to reveal God to the world. He is the Unknown Father. They are His 'only' Son, whom He chose in love before He founded the world, that they might reveal Him to such as are worthy. Hellenistic and Talmudic Judaism diverge in proportion as this endowment with *torah* is understood predominantly of the letter which killeth or the Spirit which giveth life. It is impossible to invert the relation and imagine that the Jewish conception of the Beloved Son who is chosen that he may reveal to the world the Unknown Father is borrowed from Christianity.

Appreciation of the significance and development of lyric Wisdom has received of very recent years an enormous impetus through the discovery of the *Odes of Solomon*. Whether they be fundamentally Jewish with merely superficial Christian adaptation (as the present writer still maintains), or Christian from the foundation, is a debated question. Even their date can only be determined as within about a century before or after 100 A.D. But both title and contents should at least make this point clear: The *Odes of Solomon* belong distinctively to lyric Wisdom, and have their basis in Jewish ideas. Their supreme value is that they enable us to trace the development of the Deutero-Isaian ideal of Israel as the Servant-Son, witness and martyr, through the Songs of Wisdom as known in Ben-Sirach, Wisdom of Solomon, Baruch, and elsewhere, down to and even beyond the dividing line of Christian Logos doctrine. Surely one of the first problems to which this great influx of new light should be applied is the problem of the great *logion* of the Son's revelation of the Father, the Hymn of Thanksgiving of the Q source.

If then we take first the subject of Strophe I of the *logion*, Jesus' thanksgiving for the Εὐδοκία, it should be apparent to all who have any familiarity with the *Odes of Solomon* that the theme is coincident. The opening poems exult in the election of the 'Son' as the Lord's 'Beloved,' the sharer of His 'secret,' His 'planting,' and the 'ministers' of the 'river' of His Spirit.

In the present Christian editorial adaptation of the *Odes* the speaker who constantly refers to himself as the 'Son,' the Lord's 'Beloved,' &c., and habitually employs the first person, might easily be taken for the individual poet. In spite of the entire absence from the *Odes* of any mention of the name of Jesus it is clear from the redaction that the poems have been given this individual application. But this ignores all the classic examples of Hebrew religious poetry. So familiar an instance as Ps. 23, whose theme is Jehovah's shepherding of Israel (*cf.* Is. 49 9 f.), or Ps. 18, celebrating Israel's deliverance in the Red Sea and conquest of Canaan, ought to teach us how constantly in Hebrew psalmody the personal pronoun in the first person singular has primary reference to *Israel*. The poet sings in the name of his people.

This is equally the case with lyric Wisdom, where Ecclus. 24 30–34 may serve as an example, and no less in Odes i, iii, and vii of the *Odes of Solomon*, which celebrate respectively the Crowning of Israel with the living Garland of divine Truth, its Union with Jehovah as his Beloved, and its Endowment with the Word of Knowledge. To make this certain we must scrutinize the imagery in the light of contemporary literature.

The Mishna, interpreting the *Song of Songs, which is Solomon's*, declares that "the day of espousals" (Cant. 3 11) was that of the giving of the Law at Sinai. This refers to a wide-spread tradition which explains the vows of the people's covenant to keep the law (Ex. 24 7 f.) as vows of betrothal to Jehovah. Accordingly

the stripping off of the ornaments to make the golden calf is interpreted to mean the stripping off of "the golden crown that was upon their head, whereon the NAME had been engraven and set forth at Mount Horeb."[19] *Pesikta* thus connects Ezek. 16 12 ff., "I put a crown of beauty upon thy head," &c., with Ex. 24 7, and declares that when Israel accepted God's law "God gave them of the brightness of the Shechinah." The 'crown of the law' becomes thereafter a classic phrase for rabbinic Judaism to designate the knowledge of God which is at once Israel's supreme adornment and (like the bride's tiara) the token of loving obedience to her Lord. The 'brightness of the Shechinah' which is upon it makes it a "crown of light," in the Coptic paraphrase (*Pistis Sophia* 115–16), and this perhaps accounts for the references in the *Odes* (*e.g.* xlii. 11) to the sign or seal of 'the light' as set upon God's Beloved, and references to it in Talmudic literature as "brightness from the Shechinah," and in Wisdom as a "crown of glory."

But the *Odes* present the usual contrast of the symbolism of the sages with that of the scribes. The "crown of life," or "of glory," which the Lord promised to "those that love him" (Jas. 1 12) soon becomes a commonplace of the Wisdom literature, as in Sap. 5 16 f. the righteous are promised "the royal crown of comeliness and the diadem of beauty *from the hand of* the Lord." But this is a weakening down of the Isaian original, in which (Is. 28 5) *the Lord himself becomes* "a crown of glory and a diadem of beauty to the residue of his people, a *spirit* of justice to its judges and a *spirit* of strength to its warriors." The Spirit of Jehovah suspended over His sanctuary like the pillar of fire and smoke above the altar[20] will be a living unfading chaplet in contrast with the fading wreaths on the heads of the drunkards of Ephraim. Wisdom's

[19] Jer. Targ. on Ex. 32 25.

[20] Cf. Ode xxviii, 1 f. and Ecclus. 24 4, 10 f.

song in Prov. 4 1–9 comes nearer this meaning, for Wisdom is the 'mother' that loves her sons, and keeps those that love her, of whom it is promised:

"She will give to thy head a chaplet of grace,
A crown of glory will she deliver to thee."

But only Ode i of the *Odes of Solomon* goes straight to the primitive Isaian sense, making Israel's living crown the Spirit of the Lord which gives knowledge of Himself. Only as speaking for Israel gifted with the *torah* of God can the Odist declare:

"The Lord is upon my head as a crown
And apart from Him I shall not be.
They wove for me the crown of Truth
And it caused Thy branches to bud in me.

"For it is not like a withered crown that buddeth not,
But Thou livest upon my head and hast blossomed on my head.
Thy fruits are full and perfect, full of Thy salvation."

The remainder of Ode i, all of Ode ii, and the beginning of Ode iii are unfortunately wanting. What remains of Ode iii easily proves it a Song in the vein of Canticles, a book always interpreted from the time of its reception into the canon as a nuptial song of Israel (in Christian interpretation, the Church) as Jehovah's Beloved and supposed to have been written by Solomon, to whom David had given the name Jedidiah, *i.e.* 'The Lord's Beloved.' From Ode iii we have already taken a parallel to the Pauline and Johannine doctrine of the 'sovereign grace' of the Election,[21] an election whose purpose is to "teach the sons of men to know God's ways." We need only note that Baentsch's rejection as the gloss of a Christian scribe of the single word "the Son" in the line

"Because I shall love Him—the Son—I shall be a son,"

[21] Above, p. 8.

is regarded by Harnack as indisputable.[22] Certainly God and not "the Son" is the object of the love expressed in the Ode.

More akin to the thought of Strophe I of the New Testament hymn is Ode vii, a thanksgiving for endowment with the divine Spirit of Wisdom as the Way to God. We have space to quote but a few strophes:

"He (God) hath caused me to know his soul without grudging in His singleness,[23]
For His loving-kindness hath made small His greatness.
Like my nature He became that I might learn to know Him,
And like my form that I might not turn away from Him.

"The Father of knowledge is the Word of knowledge.
He that created Wisdom is wiser than His works,
And He that created me knew when as yet I was not
What I should do when I came into being.

. . . . . .

"For to knowledge He hath appointed its way.
He hath broadened and lengthened it and made it come to all fulness,
And He hath set upon it the footprints of His light,
And I have gone (therein) from the beginning to the end.[24]

"For from Him it (γνῶσις) was wrought, and *it hath rest in the Son.*
And for the sake of their redemption he (the Son) will lay hold upon all things,
And the Most High shall be known through His saints
To bring [the good] tidings to such as have psalms of the Coming of the Lord."

The strophe which tells of the condescending loving-kindness of the Lord in making Himself known gives at first the impression of a reference to the incarnation of Christ; but the impression is misleading, for as the poem proceeds it becomes evident that it is the Creator and

[22] Meines Erachtens sicher.

[23] Greek ἀφθονῶς ἐν τῷ ἁπλότητι αὐτοῦ, *i.e.* generously in His liberality. The Syriac has taken ἁπλότητι literally as in Mt. 6 22.

[24] Cf. the claim of the revealing 'Son,' "All things are delivered to me of my Father."

Father of Wisdom — terms impossible to imagine applied to Christ by any writer of this period — of whose condescension the odist sings in the vein of Ps. 138, and Is. 57 15 and 66 1 f., while the revealing Son is seen in the closing lines to be "the people of the saints of the Most High." But even were it granted for argument's sake that the poem is a wholly Christian product, we are not so much concerned with the product as with the material; and the material, the basic ideas of election and predestination to the function of Leader in the Way of God for the redemption of the world, can be proved over and over again to be the prerogative of Israel, the revealing Son in pre-Christian lyric Wisdom.

In the Ode the speaker to whom God has stooped "that I might not turn away from Him" proceeds to refer to his own election in the divine foreknowledge. God has entrusted him with all the Way of *gnosis*. Its "rest" is "in the Son," who "takes hold of all things for their redemption." We shall need presently to enquire just what is meant by the 'resting' of Wisdom in the Son, but our first step should be to place alongside of Ode vii the Wisdom-song of Bar. 3 9–4 4, which similarly celebrates the Way of God whose keeping is committed to Israel:

> "Hear, O Israel, the commandments of life;
> Give ear to understand wisdom.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Thou hast forsaken the fountain of wisdom;
> For if thou hadst walked in the Way of God
> Thou shouldest have dwelt in peace forever."

The poet then dwells upon the hiding of wisdom from the world in ancient and younger days:

> "Younger men have seen the light and dwelt upon the earth,
> But the Way of knowledge have they not known
> Neither understood they the paths thereof."

So further of the various great peoples of the past he repeats in turn:

"These did not God choose, neither gave He the Way of knowledge unto them;
So they perished because they had no wisdom,
They perished through their own folly.
Who hath gone up into heaven and taken her,
And brought her down from the clouds?
Who hath gone over the sea and found her,
And will bring her for choice gold?
There is none that knoweth her Way
Nor any that comprehendeth her path.
But He that knoweth all things knoweth her,
He found her out with His understanding.

. . . . . .

He that sendeth forth the light and it goeth,
He called it, and it obeyed Him with fear.[25]

. . . . . .

"This is our God, none other shall be accounted of in comparison with Him
He hath found out all the Way of knowledge, and hath given it to Jacob His Servant
And to Israel that is His Beloved."

It is perhaps a later hand which attaches the ten concluding lines:

"This is the book of the commandments of God
And the Law that endureth forever.
All they that hold it fast obtain life,
But such as leave it shall die.
Turn thee, O Jacob, and take hold of it,
Walk towards her, shining in the presence of the light thereof.
Give not thy glory to another
Nor the things that profit thee to a strange nation.
O Israel, happy are we;
For the things that are pleasing to God are made known unto us."

[25] These verses of Bar. 3 33 f. should be compared also with Odes of Solomon xii and xvi, 12–16.

Paul in Rom. 10 6 f. applies the passage quoted from Deuteronomy by this poet (Dt. 30 12 f.) to Christ who as the Wisdom of God reaches from the height of heaven to nethermost abyss. But to this we can only advert in passing. The point which now concerns us is that the idea of Israel's election as the Son, the Beloved of God who makes known the Father, revealing the hidden Way of light and life, is adoptive in Christian literature, *and must therefore always be interpreted with reference to its derivation.* This is eminently true of the image of the 'resting' of the (Wisdom-) Spirit in the Son, by which the Jewish poet expresses the doctrine of the *plenary* endowment of Israel with divine revelation as against its hiding from (or rejection by) the Gentiles.

It would be easy to multiply Jewish parallels from lyric Wisdom, especially from the *Odes of Solomon*, concerning God's hiding from the world of the mystery of creative wisdom, that He might convey it to "babes" for their 'redemption' to eternal life through the ministration of His Son (Israel) the Beloved. We should especially direct attention to Ode vi, on the River of the Water of Life which "spreads over the face of the whole earth and fills everything,"[26] Israel being "the ministers of that draught, who are entrusted with that water of His," and invite comparison with the Wisdom-ode of Ecclus. 24 30–34, where again the speaker is Israel, minister of the draught of water of life to all the nations.

Strophe II of the Q *logion* on the Son's revelation of the Unknown Father is especially susceptible of abundant illustration from these sources. But there is less need of this in view of parallels already cited in support of the clause, "No man knoweth the Son save the Father." Parallels to Strophe III, both from Ben-Sirach and the *Odes of Solomon*, have been already cited by Norden. Such space as we may still claim will be better applied, therefore, to the elucidation through

[26] Ode vi, 10, resting on Is. 11 9 and Ezek. 47.

parallels both Jewish and Christian of the conception of the divine good-pleasure (εὐδοκία), the election of the Son to *fulness* of knowledge (γνῶσις). "I thank Thee for election to *gnosis*. . . . All *gnosis* is delivered to me as sole revealer."

Norden justly remarks[27] that clause *a* of Strophe II is a typical claim to *complete gnosis*. We have seen in what sense Paul repeats the claim on behalf of himself and his fellow-evangelists in 1 Cor. 2 6–16, and may take occasion to supplement this by reference to the similar claim on behalf of all Spirit-endowed Christians in 1 Jn. 2 20, 27. The full endowment with *gnosis* here claimed on behalf of Christian preachers, and even of the brotherhood as a whole, is of course more directly claimed by primitive Christians in behalf of Christ, often with citation of Is. 11 2. The various charismatic gifts in the church are regarded as but partial endowments from the complete "mind of Christ." He was "full of grace and truth," and "of his fulness" all had received. The transfer was not begun in Christian literature. In *Eth. Enoch* xlviii, 1–xlix, 3 we already have the same transition with use of the same proof-text:

"In that place [the glorified Holy Land] I saw a fountain of righteousness which was inexhaustible; around it were many fountains of wisdom, and all the thirsty drank of them and were filled with wisdom, and had their dwellings with the righteous and holy and elect. . . . For wisdom is poured out like water, and glory faileth not before him ['the Anointed One'] for ever and ever. For he is mighty in all the secrets of righteousness, and unrighteousness will disappear as a shadow and have no continuance, because the Elect One standeth before the Lord of Spirits, and his glory is for ever and ever, and his might unto all generations. And in him dwells the spirit of wisdom, and the spirit of Him who gives knowledge, and the spirit of understanding and of might and the spirit of those who have fallen asleep in righteousness. And he will judge the secret things and no one will be able to utter a lying word before him; for he is the Elect One before the Lord of Spirits according to His good-pleasure."

[27] P. 288 f.

We shall have occasion presently to observe how this conception of the whole fountain of *gnosis* being committed to Israel and its Messiah passes over into Christian thought, but our present task is to show that the "resting" of the divine Spirit of Wisdom in Israel as the chosen Son is of the very essence of the Jewish doctrine of Israel's election as conceived in lyric Wisdom.

We have already had occasion to quote from *Odes of Solomon* vii, 18, "From Him it (wisdom) was wrought and *it hath rest in the Son*," as a claim of Israel to possess all (redemptive) wisdom. The claim is in fact a commonplace of this literature from Ben-Sirach's Song of Wisdom down. In Ecclus. 24 7 ff. Wisdom complains of her fruitless quest among the peoples for an abiding-place:

> "With all these I sought rest,
> And in whose inheritance shall I lodge?
> Then the Creator of all things gave me a commandment
> And He that created me made my tabernacle to rest,
> And said, Let thy tabernacle be in Jacob
> And thine inheritance in Israel."

As we have seen, Baruch 3 9 ff. also dwells upon the theme of Wisdom's finding no dwelling-place save in Israel, and even Talmudic literature presents its own characteristic variation on the theme in the legend of the rejection of 'the Law' by all other peoples, Israel alone welcoming it.

But Ben-Sirach's theme is itself only a development. In verses 10 ff. Wisdom continues:

> "In the holy tabernacle I ministered before Him,
> And so was I established in Zion;
> In the beloved city likewise He gave me 'rest.'"

This is an elaboration of Ps. 132, where David sings as the ark is brought up from Kirjath Jearim:

"Arise, O Jehovah, into thy 'rest,'
Thou, and the ark of thy strength.
For Jehovah hath chosen Zion,
He hath desired it for His habitation.
This (saith He) is my 'rest' forever,
Here will I dwell; for I have desired it."

Thus in lyric Wisdom the choosing of Zion as the 'resting-place' of Jehovah's spirit becomes coincident with the choosing of His First-born that the Spirit of Wisdom may 'rest' upon him in its fulness; and from an endowment of the elect people this inevitably becomes, both in Jewish and Christian thought, an endowment of Messiah their leader and representative.

It is in this Jewish doctrine of the plenary endowment of the elect *people* that we must trace the New Testament conception of the 'good-pleasure' which foreordains the Son as God's Beloved upon whom His Spirit 'rests.' According to Paul (Col. 1 15–20, 26 f.):

"It was the good-pleasure (εὐδόκησεν) that the whole 'fulness' should settle down (κατοικῆσαι) upon the First-born, and that all things should be redeemed (ἀποκαταλλάξαι) in him."

In Christ accordingly "are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." He is "the mystery (unveiled secret) of God." His spirit "in" the saints is a manifestation of "the mystery that hath been hid for ages and generations"; for in them as His witnesses "among the Gentiles" it is God's good-pleasure "to make known the wealth of the glory of this mystery."

What Paul means by the good-pleasure that the whole *pleroma* should settle down upon the First-born becomes apparent from the Gospel story of the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus at his baptism, with the Voice proclaiming the good-pleasure of the divine adoption (Mk. 1 10 f. and parallels).[28] Especially clear does it

[28] On the meaning of the voice from heaven at the baptism declaring the divine election of the Son, cf. Bacon, art. "The Aorist εὐδόκησα in Mk. 1 11," Journ. of Bibl. Lit. xvi (1897).

become in the peculiarly Jewish form of the story as quoted by Jerome from the *Gospel according to the Hebrews:*

"And it came to pass when the Lord had gone up out of the water that *the whole fountain* of the Holy Spirit descended and *rested* upon him and said to him: My son, in all the prophets I was waiting for thee that thou shouldst come and I should find *rest* in thee. For thou art my *rest;* thou art my First-born who shalt reign forever."

The fragment is employing the same passage (Is. 42 1) which forms the basis of the baptism story in the canonical Gospels, but whereas these clearly follow a text corresponding to Mt. 12 18,

"Behold, my Servant whom I have chosen,
My Beloved, on whom my soul fixed her good-pleasure.
I will put my Spirit upon him,"

the uncanonical source follows a text corresponding to the Septuagint:

"Jacob my Servant, I will have compassion on him;
Israel my Elect, my soul *hath waited for him* (προσεδέξατο αὐτὸν ἡ ψυχή μου)."

Jerome's knowledge of the Aramaic source is probably derived from the commentary on Isaiah of Apollinarios of Laodicea, who had lived among the Aramaic speaking Jewish Christian community of northern Syria which used this gospel; for Jerome (who knew no Aramaic) gives the quotation in his comment on Is. 11 2:

"And the Spirit of Jehovah shall *rest* upon him—
The Spirit of wisdom and understanding,
The Spirit of counsel and might,
The Spirit of the knowledge and fear of Jehovah."

Great significance attaches in other Christian interpreters much earlier than Jerome to the word 'shall rest' (Heb. *nachah*=LXX. ἀναπαύσεται). In the Wisdom-song of Ecclus. 24 5–7 it seems to have suggested the imagery of

the dove seeking 'rest' for the sole of her foot and finding none until she returns to Noah ("man of 'rest'") in the ark. To Justin Martyr (*Dial.* lxxxvii) it signifies the finality and completeness of the endowment of Jesus with the gifts of the Spirit. Trypho the Jew asks:

"Tell me, then, how, when the Scripture asserts by Isaiah, 'There shall come forth a shoot from the root of Jesse . . . and the Spirit of God shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and piety and the spirit of the fear of the Lord shall fill him,' how he can be demonstrated to be pre-existent who is filled with the powers of the Holy Spirit which the Scripture enumerates by Isaiah, as if he were in lack of them?"

Justin replies:

"The Scripture says that these enumerated powers of the Spirit came on him not because he stood in need of them but because they would *rest* in him, that is, would find their *completion* in him, so that there would be no more prophets in your nation . . . ; for after him no prophet has arisen among you. Now your prophets each received some one or two powers from God. Solomon possessed the spirit of wisdom, Daniel that of understanding and counsel, Moses that of might and piety, Elijah that of the fear (of God) and Isaiah that of knowledge (γνῶσις). And so with others, each possessed one power (of the Spirit). Accordingly it 'rested,' *that is, ceased,* when that One came after whom it was requisite that such gifts should cease from you, and having received their 'rest' in Him, should again become (separate) gifts which He imparts to those who believe on Him, according as he deems each man worthy."

Here is our complete definition of the doctrine of the 'pleroma' of the 'powers' or 'gifts of the Spirit' finding their 'rest' in the Son. The Jewish-Christian Gospel puts it in most succinct form: "The 'whole fountain' of the Spirit descended and 'rested' on Jesus at his baptism and said, 'My Son, I was waiting for thee in the prophets, but thou art my 'rest,' thou art my First-born.'" And this is the same doctrine declared by Paul to the Colossians as

"the revelation of the mystery hid from all ages and generations but now manifested unto the saints, to whom it was the good-pleasure of God to make known what is the riches of the glory of this mystery among the Gentiles, which is Christ in (or among) you, the hope of glory."

For, as he had said in the preceding context, "We have our redemption in the Son of His love" (=Eph. 1 6, "the Beloved"), who is

"the First-born of all creation . . . for all things have been created through Him and unto Him, and He is before all things and in Him all things have their consistency. . . . For it was the good-pleasure that all the fulness should make its dwelling (κατοικῆσαι) upon Him."

The phraseology ("the Beloved," "the First-born," "mystery hid from the ages," "before the creation," "the good-pleasure," "the fulness," "manifest among the Gentiles") shows that Justin and the Jewish-Christian Gospel and Paul are all dealing with stereotyped conceptions common to Judaism and Christianity. Moreover there is an unmistakable affinity with the baptismal vision of Mk. 1 10 f. and its Synoptic parallels. The root-idea of both is the doctrine of the 'tabernacling' of the Logos in the midst of the chosen (Ecclus. 24 8), which in Jn. 1 14, 16 becomes a fulness (πλήρωμα) of grace and truth, a 'fulness' from which we all receive. The Pauline doctrine then is not derived from the Synoptic story of the election of the Son. The roots of both are in lyric Wisdom. Lyric Wisdom sings of a First-born of the creation, "the instrument by which the world was created, and which was given to Israel," that "spirit of the Lord which hath filled the world and holdeth all things together" (Sap. 1 7). Lyric Wisdom knows also how "in every generation entering into holy souls it maketh men to be prophets and friends of God," but declares that its 'rest' in its 'fulness' is in Israel the Beloved Son, and Israel's representative the Messiah.

The Pauline doctrine and the Synoptic are parallel developments from a common root. So also is the Logos doctrine of Jn. 1 14, 16–18, concerning the 'Only-begotten' Son endowed with the 'pleroma of grace and truth,' whose function is to 'declare the Father.' If the Pauline and Johannine conception of the election of the Son to be the Revealer of the Unknown Father can be said to have a Christian literary derivation, it will be an earlier form than the Synoptic enunciation of the good-pleasure. It will be the 'Hymn of Thanksgiving' of the Second Source, whose three strophes celebrate respectively: I, The Election of the Beloved in the divine Good-pleasure as custodian of the hidden Mystery; II, The Adoption to Sonship as Organ of Revelation; III, The Appeal to Men to accept the Easy Yoke. But the Pauline and Johannine developments are far too rich to be thus simply accounted for. They have behind them the copious elaboration of Isaian themes in Jewish and Alexandrian lyric Wisdom, whereof the *Odes of Solomon* form but the latest and most mystical development. In this literature it is that the transition is made by slow stages of advance from a nationalistic to an individualistic interpretation of the titles the 'Son,' the 'Beloved,' the 'First-born' and 'Only-begotten.'

The hymn of Mt. 11 25–30 = Lk. 10 21 f. is a lyric of the divine Wisdom, like those of the *Odes of Solomon*, and the Jewish and Hellenistic odes on which these rest. The present setting of both is Christian, and the degree and proportion of Christian coloration will doubtless long remain a subject of dispute. The vital point is that we now have the key to their interpretation, and that key is the pre-Christian doctrine of Election—the Chosen People the divine Organ of Revelation.

# THEOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

JAMES H. LEUBA

The recent extension of scientific psychology to religious life could not leave the theologian unconcerned. "What theological problems can the psychological treatment of religion solve?" "According to what method must the psychology of religion proceed?" These and other questions have become, especially among German theologians, frequent topics of discussion.

The Ritschlians had solved the relation of science to religion by divorcing them. This significant tactical movement was in essence the outcome of the conviction to which theology had been driven, that all efforts at harmonizing science and religion had failed. Psychologists of mark have spoken in support of the Ritschlian opinion. Flournoy, for instance, voiced the belief in the independence of religion from science: "Never be afraid of science. . . . In particular do not fear its influence upon your faith, for science and faith are not of the same order. Science is neutral, silent, 'agnostic,' regarding the foundation of things and the final meaning of life. It is an unfair use of it which makes it proclaim any dogma whatsoever, whether materialistic or spiritualistic. And so, never ask of it arguments favoring your convictions; the support it might seem to lend you would be but a reed, which, should you lean upon it, would pierce your hand. But be equally certain that it does not speak in favor of antagonistic doctrines."[1]

The opinion that theology is independent of science is usually found associated with another characteristic

[1] Th. Flournoy, Le Génie Religieux, a lecture to the Swiss Students' Christian Association, Sainte-Croix, 1904. P. 34.

tenet: "inner experience" is held to be the only source, or at least the ultimate source, of belief. It is indeed strange that most of those who adopt the independence-from-science theory should look to inner experience as the ultimate ground of belief. The theology of "inner experience" reopens the debate which Ritschl thought he had closed, since to regard the facts of the inner life as those upon which theology rests is to make it dependent upon psychological science.

Let it be understood, however, that the theologians with whom I am concerned—not even those who, like Wobbermin, point to a psychological method as *the* method of theology—have not the least intention of deriving the fundamental propositions of their system from a *scientific* treatment of religious experience. Wobbermin, for instance, affirms that the reality of the objects of faith, instead of being identical in kind with the reality of the objects of knowledge, is, on the contrary, "completely different both in qualitative and in quantitative respects." "God and divine things are not and cannot be objects of human knowledge (Wissens und Erkennens)"; they are objects of faith. The absolute value of religion is *given* with even greater certitude than is the reality of the objects of empirical experience.[2]

The divorce of theology from science is pronounced on one or both of two related grounds. Either God is said to be a transcendental object and therefore inaccessible to science; or religious knowledge is said to be a form of knowledge altogether different from scientific knowledge. We shall take up in succession these two claims.

[2] Georg Wobbermin, Die Religionspsychologische Methode in Religionswissenschaft und Theologie. Leipzig; Hinrich, 1913, pp. 388–391. This is the most formal effort made so far to set forth a psychological method for the use of theology. (Reviewed by the author in the Psy. Bull., Dec. 15, pp. 462–470.)

1. *The object of religion (God) is a transcendental object, and is therefore inaccessible to science.* Every historical religion, with the exception of Comtism, is rooted in the belief in anthropopathic personal Power, or Powers, with whom man can maintain such direct personal relations as are implied in Christian worship. Replace that God by the Absolute of modern Idealism, and sacrifices, offerings, prayers, have lost their proper object; the Christian books of common prayer have become irrelevant. The relations that can be maintained by man with the Absolute of metaphysics and with the gods of religion, are different because these conceptions are different. They cannot be used interchangeably. Each may be used in its proper place, for different purposes. There are men who in critical, rationalistic moods entertain the idea of an Eternal Reason, an impersonal Creative Energy; and who, in times of pressing moral needs, apparently believe in a personal Being. In the latter alternative only can they conform to the demands of any religion. Here are instances in which this shift of conception is clearly realized. The first three are from an investigation, not yet published, on "The American College Students' Idea of God":

"God to my mind is an impersonal being; but whether for convenience or through sheer impotence, I pray to him as a personal being. I probably think of Christ when I pray."

"I think of God as both a personal and impersonal being. I think of him as personal when I feel the need of some support outside myself; a sympathy and understanding which no one else can give. I like to think of him as impersonal at other times; as a power like ether, which is infused through everything."

"In an agitated or excited state of mind, I think of God as a Personal Father who is ready to reward or punish. But generally I think of God as a mass of forces having certain effects follow from certain causes; the force that causes us to do good will bring with it its own reward, and *vice versa*."

A German well known by his psychological works writes:

"Fortunately, to know and to understand God, which is impossible, is not essential; but to feel and to 'live Him' is the crucial, necessary thing. To realize that entirely practical ideal, we must, in my opinion, believe in a personal God. For it seems to me impossible for man to be able to enter into ethical relations with an impersonal being. Is not this the most profound meaning of Christianity; the Divine One took flesh, He became man to reveal Himself a man, not in order to be understood but that He might be loved? I feel, therefore, that we have not only the right, but perhaps even the duty to represent to ourselves the Divine as a personal God. *But, at the same time, we must never forget that this idea corresponds not to the nature of the Divine*, but only to the nature of man. *It is only an expedient*, but, as it seems to me, an indispensable expedient." [3]

Men of surpassing intellectual power have done even as this German scientist, and not every one of them has been able to keep in mind the merely expedient character of the personal conception. St. Augustine recognized that the expression "mercy" could not properly be applied to the Absolute, since the word implies suffering through the suffering of others. Nevertheless, he thought himself justified in using the term in order "to save the ignorant from stumbling." The "ignorant!" The learned doctor himself found it impossible to believe only in the impersonal, infinite God. The *Confessions* show that, like less powerful intellects, St. Augustine maintained tender sentimental relations with his God; relations more dignified, to be sure, but of the same character as those described by the great love-sick Spanish mystic. Schleiermacher provides another illustrious instance of the existence side by side of two God-conceptions, each one used in turn according to the need of the moment. "To attribute mercy to

[3] Le Divin, Expériences et Hypothèses, Marcel Hebert, p. 130.

God," writes Schleiermacher, "were more appropriate to a homiletic or poetic manner of speaking than to the dogmatic." [4]

There should not be need of argumentation in defense of the affirmation that a God who does not stand in direct affective and intellectual relation with man is not the God of the Christian, nor of any other historical religion, save Comtism. I have in another place attempted to show with some fulness of detail that these two conceptions of the Divinity have had different origins, and that still other God-ideas have arisen from other sources. Here I can only say that under the urgency of different needs man formed several ideas of great, trans-human beings; and that the attributes ascribed to these beings were different with the different needs which instigated their discovery or creation. For instance, out of the logical necessity, in order to understand the universe, of stopping somewhere in the regression by which science passes from one phenomenon to another regarded as its cause, arises the so-called cosmological argument for the existence of a First Cause. A need quite different urges the Christian mystics to a belief in a quite different Being, the loving All-Father.

Now, a Being can legitimately possess only the attributes required in order to gratify the need from which he arose. Thus the Cosmological Being may properly be spoken of as the First Cause, the Absolute, the Principle of Unification, or even the "eternally Complete Consciousness," but he should not receive names denoting anthropopathic personality. To conceive of the First Cause as personal in that sense is to add elements foreign to those demanded by the logical necessity of stopping the regression of secondary causes. The Being which the metaphysical arguments seek to demonstrate for the gratification of our logical propensity

[4] Der Christliche Glaube, p. 85.

must be conceived of as impassive, whereas the Being demanded by the Christian heart and conscience must above all else be a compassionate and righteous Being.

That the gods of metaphysics are not the gods of religion, is clearly acknowledged by Arthur J. Balfour in the last Gifford Lectures. "When in the course of these lectures," writes this philosopher, "I speak of God, I mean something other than an Identity wherein all differences vanish, or a Unity which includes but does not transcend the differences which it somehow holds in solution. I mean a God whom men can love, to whom men can pray, who takes sides, who has purposes and preferences, whose attributes, howsoever conceived, leave unimpaired the possibility of a personal relation between Himself and those whom He has created." [5]

When one says in Hegelian phraseology that the Absolute is self-revealing, that the world and the finite consciousness of man are manifestations of God, and that man experiences the Absolute, one uses the terms "manifestation" and "revelation" in a sense quite different from that given to them by the practising Christian. The latter means by these terms an intervention of God's loving power, producing those selected inner experiences which seem to him specifically divine; whereas the philosopher means that the developing consciousness itself is, in its entirety, an expression of God. It should be evident to all that a God of whom the whole universe is the manifestation, and whose action is always in the form of law, is not the Being celebrated and invoked in any liturgy. The gods of the historical religions stand over against nature, and are powerful to alter the course of events at their good pleasure. That is the conception which pervades every form of established worship.

[5] Theism and Humanism. 1914. Pp. 20–21. For an attempted demonstration of the correctness of this distinction, see chapter xi, especially pages 245 to 254, of my book, A Psychological Study of Religion; its Origin, its Function, and its Future. Macmillan, 1912.

If today not all Christians hear God in the thunder or see him otherwise manipulating physical nature, they are at least unanimous in affirming that God reveals himself in what is termed interchangeably "inner" or "spiritual" experience; "there," they say, "in my consciousness is manifested the truth of religion, the reality of God." Some hold that in these experiences God is directly "apprehended" or "perceived"; that is the mystical position. Others hold that spiritual experiences are only the data from which God is inferred; in both cases specific experiences are accepted as sufficient to prove the truth of religion. What are these specific "inner" or "spiritual" experiences? Here are two fairly typical quotations from which may be gathered both *that God is held to reveal himself* in inner experience and *what is the nature* of his supposed action.

A professor at the school of Protestant theology of Paris writes:

"God is not a phenomenon that we may observe apart from ourselves, or a truth demonstrable by logical reasoning. He who does not feel Him in his heart will never feel Him from without. The object of religious knowledge reveals itself only in the subject, by means of the religious phenomena themselves." [6]

*Digamma* of Oxford University rests his faith upon the induction made from the following facts. At twenty-one he found himself involved in circumstances that seemed as if they must lead to the ruin of his career. I quote:

"The circumstances of which I have spoken tended to produce extreme mental depression. A cloud had, as it were, descended upon my life. *But I noticed that after earnest prayer this depression was greatly relieved, and at times completely vanished.* That which struck me most in the phenomenon was its irrationality. What I mean is that the relief was experienced again and again without any consciousness of its cause. I could not attribute it to a feeling

[6] Sabatier, A., Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, James Pott & Co., N.Y. 1902. P. 308.

of satisfaction at having performed a religious duty, for I noticed that the relief came in many cases when no such feeling of satisfaction was or had been present in my mind. The importance of the phenomenon in respect to one's life was such as to lead me to further observation of it; and this process of induction has with me extended over a period of more than twenty years. . . . In watching this phenomenon, therefore, I have carefully checked my observation and have excluded all instances in which some intermediary cause intervened between prayer and the mental happiness resulting from it. In the thousands of instances which have come under my observation, for the phenomenon is at least of daily occurrence, *I have never observed any case in which earnest prayer has not been answered (to use the ordinary word), by an increase of mental happiness.*

"I do not wish it to be supposed that my observation leads me to believe that a high level of mental happiness must always result from prayer. There are other factors, of course, in the calculation, and, above all, the factor of bodily condition. Still, I imagine, though I cannot say that I have ever realized, that this factor may be to a great extent eliminated by the action of that factor which we call prayer. 'The prayer of a righteous man availeth much,' is after all a saying which must be true if the power of prayer is in any sense admitted. But, nevertheless, even to one who, like myself, is but ordinary in respect to righteousness, the conviction has come after long years of observation, that *prayer does invariably raise the level of mental happiness. . . . Consequently my faith rests upon an empirical basis.* But time forbids my speaking of the deductions from this major premise. This at any rate I know, that God can be approached along those paths along which I was led in childhood."[7]

I may add that the chief purpose of William James in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* was to find facts pointing to the intervention in man of a superhuman power or powers. His search was for a specific class of facts of inner experience. He had undertaken a *scientific*, not a metaphysical demonstration of the existence of a power of the kind necessary to religion.[8]

[7] Digamma, An Aspect of Prayer, an Address before a "Society in a certain College in Oxford," Oxford, B. H. Blackwell. The italics are mine.

[8] See Inter. Jr. of Ethics, 1904, vol. 14, pp. 323–339; or A Psychological Study of Religion, pp. 237–239; 272–274.

Without amplifying this too brief elucidation, I may conclude that the God of religion — not any God; not, for instance, the Absolute of modern Idealism — is known in "inner experiences," *i.e.*, in the appearance in consciousness of particular states or processes. The knowledge of God derived from these experiences is an empirical knowledge. Remove these facts of consciousness and the God of religion may continue to exist, but he ceases to be an object of human knowledge.

2. *Religious knowledge is an altogether different sort of knowledge from scientific knowledge.* Here the limitation of religious psychology, instead of being found in the transcendental nature of God, is discovered in the nature of religious knowledge. Let me restate briefly the argument as it appears in Ritschlian literature.

Religion is concerned with judgments of value, expressive of the bond connecting man with the universe. The specifically religious function of the mind is, according to Ritschl, the formation of certain judgments or "perceptions" of value. These judgments proceed from the effect that certain ideas have upon man when he accepts them as true. For example, the idea of Jesus conceived as the only Son of God, produces in man experiences having a peculiar affective quality and significance. W. Herrmann considers that "the religious view is an answer to the question, 'How must the world be judged if the highest good is to be real?'" "The concern of religion is to regard the multiplicity of the world as the orderly whole of means by which the highest value of the pious man, which is expressed in feeling, is realized."

Religious knowledge is, in this view, an expression of the value, of the feeling-significance, to the individual of a certain category of facts, in particular of those in which man apprehends his relation to the universe. That

knowledge is, we are told, outside of the sphere of science, for values are experiences upon which science cannot do its work of analysis and causal explanation. It follows that religious and scientific knowledge cannot enter into conflict with each other; they move in altogether different spheres. This argument, grounded upon the assumption that religion is concerned with values and not with causal relations, has become the stock argument by which Ritschlians, as well as other theologians and even psychologists, defend the independence of religion from science.

If this argument were to be regarded as representing correctly and fully the nature of religion, causal relations and questions of objective existence would lie outside of theology. It could have nothing to say about the existence of God or of Christ, but only about the value to man of the God-idea. Ritschl has in fact been accused of affirming only the subjective and not the objective existence of God. However that may be, there is no lack of men who like Ritschl assume the rôle of defensors of the Christian religion, and yet declare openly that religious conceptions are only images. One reads, for instance, in a late number of the *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie* that the religious conceptions should not be regarded as descriptive of objective existences; they serve merely as means for the expression and development of the religious values; they are merely symbols, one may even call them poetical forms.[9]

The absurd length to which a symbolic interpretation of Christian dogma may be carried is exemplified in Hegel's philosophy of religion. He speaks of revealed religion, but he excludes from the meaning of that term any manifestation of God by a supernatural or miraculous channel; of the love of God, but the expression "God is love" means for him that in the Absolute contradictions

[9] K. A. Busch, vol. 5, 1911, pp. 209–218.

are transcended, what is opposed to God is yet in union with him; of the Son, but the meaning of that metaphor is that "when we concentrate attention on the manifestation of God, as distinguished from his inner essence, we are dealing with God as the 'other' of Himself."[10] However numerous the supporters of Christianity who affirm merely the symbolic or the poetic character of the Christian God-idea, it is the presence of realists which makes possible the continuance of the existing religious institutions. If all men were symbolists with regard to the religious conceptions, the ludicrousness of a company of worshippers assembled to repeat the Christian creeds, the litany, and the prayers of the books of Common Worship, would be overpowering. How long would the long-bearded St. Nicholases be on our street corners, if none of our children were naïve realists?[11]

The Ritschlian argument just sketched is open to the two following objections:

(*a*) The nature of religion is stated so incompletely in that argument as to invalidate its conclusion. The formation of judgments of value is indeed a constituent

[10] John Watson, The Interpretation of Religious Experience, I, p. 345.

[11] I am well aware that much of the religious and theological language is in a sense figurative even for those whom I have designated as naïve realists. But symbolism does not reach for them the more fundamental dogma of religion. I know also that there is a sense in which all speech can be said to be symbolic. But the realists of whom we speak give to the term another than that general meaning, for they discriminate in theological formulae between figurative and non-figurative expressions. One reads, for instance, in an Outline of Christian Theology by W. N. Clarke (15 ed., pp. 3, 65, 13) much used by students: "In a definition of God it is best as far as possible to avoid figurative language; for metaphors are ambiguous, and figurative language in a compact statement tends to destroy the proportion and draw undue attention to minor points." And the author proceeds to define God as a Personal Spirit, Infinite, Omnipresent, Omniscient, Immutable, Holy, and Loving. These terms are not for him symbolic. Nor should we take him as speaking figuratively when he says, "Revelation to Israel through Moses was not made in writing; it was made in small parts by speech, but mainly by action, for Israel was taught to know God and His will mainly in what He did among them."

Should I be criticised for a lack of historical sense, I should turn upon my critics with the remark that they suffer from an excessive wish to see likenesses and continuity. The philosopher should recognize both the likenesses and the differences characteristic of successive historical movements. There are points in social development separated by differences so important that to use the old terms in the new sense can lead only to misunderstanding.

part of religious life, but it is also a part of *every other form* of human activity.

Whether it be in business, in ethics, in art, or in religion, our behavior is conditioned by judgments of value. One does not come much nearer to the complete truth by making of a specific class of judgments of value — those referring to man's relation to God — the distinguishing mark of religion. The essential nature of religion cannot be described adequately in terms of value-judgments of any sort, for religion is not merely an appreciation of that which has (ultimate) value; *it is an expression of desire for that to which worth is ascribed.*

(*b*) In a being constituted as man is, a sense of value leads inevitably to a search for means of securing or preserving that which has value. The gods about whom religions were built had an experiential origin in the needs for the understanding of experience and for assistance in the struggle for physical and moral growth. Therefore *religious beliefs and practices constitute a system of means for the realization of values.* Thus religion is vitally concerned with causal relations.

For those who realize that the transcendental, impassive Absolute is not and never has been the God of any organized religion, the relation of science to theology may be stated as follows:

1. The gods of the religions, called into existence in human consciousness for the gratification of certain needs (logical, affective, ethical, and æsthetic), are now held to manifest themselves in and through their action upon the physical universe, or within man, or both. They have the value of empirical inductions, and are therefore objects of scientific research as much as and for the same reason as any scientific hypothesis.

2. The means and the methods by which man has learned to enter into relation with his gods involve, as a

matter of course, causal relations between him and the divinity. These means and methods fall therefore also within the field of scientific investigation.

3. In so far as doctrines are affirmations regarding the nature of the gods of religion, the nature of man, and the means and the conditions of saving intercourse with the divinity, they fall within the pale of science.

The greater number of these scientific theological problems is referable to psychology.

# BOOK REVIEWS

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THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE LIGHT OF TO-DAY. A Study in Moral Development. WILLIAM FREDERIC BADÉ. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1915. Pp. xxii, 326. $1.75.

This is in the main a history of Israel's religious ideas and ethical practices down to the Exile. It contains, however, not only an account of the historical development of Israel's religio-ethical life but also a critical estimate of it in the light of modern thought. It is the latter fact that explains the title and gives to the volume its special interest and value.

The author's aim is positive and constructive. He seeks to "help students and teachers of the Old Testament to find a new and securer place for it in the religious thought of our time." But this apologetic purpose in no way interferes with the genuinely scientific character of the work. Indeed, in this regard the author walks so straight that, if anything, he leans backward. On most controverted points of Old Testament criticism and interpretation he takes the more radical view. Of the religion of the pre-prophetic period he evidently has a quite low opinion, though he admits that the dark picture he has drawn of it might easily be brightened by citing instances in which higher conceptions of God and duty came to expression. The decalogue, he holds, was "compiled after the great prophets had finished their work," and the origin of the seventh-day Sabbath is assigned to "about the time of the Exile." The eighth-century prophets were not monotheists; Jehovah was looked upon as "intramundane." There was also in their utterances no place for the messianic or eschatological. Not until we reach Jeremiah does "ethical as well as theoretical monotheism" appear. Deuteronomy was directed not against the worship of foreign gods but against "polyjahvism." The doctrine of the *shema* (Dt. 6, 4) is not monotheism but "monojahvism." Jeremiah was an opponent of the Deuteronomic reform, and Ezekiel represented a "priestly mis-development of Hebrew religion." As an offset to the tendency represented by some of these views the reader, who is not familiar with current Old Testament literature, would

do well to go carefully through *The Religion of Israel under the Kingdom* by A. C. Welch, one of the most significant books on the Old Testament that has appeared in English for a number of years.

In his comparison of the teaching of the Old Testament with modern thought Professor Badé seems more interested in pointing out the contrast between the two than in establishing points of affinity between them. This is due to his desire to exhibit the utter impossibility of holding to the traditional dogmatic conception of the Old Testament. Indeed, his book is to a certain extent a polemic against this dogmatic view, which he has apparently found unpleasantly prominent in his own immediate environment. The result is that here and there the author seems unduly severe in his criticism of certain aspects of Israelitic religion. He hardly gives adequate recognition to two principles which ought to be observed in all sympathetic study of the Old Testament. First, its teaching should be viewed against the background of heathenism rather than that of modern thought. And secondly, it should be borne in mind that there are many non-essential things in religion which are essential in order to make religion effective in the world. The latter truth is of special importance in our estimate of the priestly type of religion with its exclusiveness and other obsolete features. "An earnest protest," says our author, "should be entered against the widespread habit, in theological literature, of excusing this exclusiveness on the ground that it was necessary to preserve the identity of Judaism." But an equally earnest protest might well be registered against that impractical type of idealism, which is blind to the historically and psychologically necessary conditions of religious development.

But while the book is thus rather more negative in its attitude than seems necessary to the present reviewer, it is in every way a work of solid merit. Its scholarship is thorough and comprehensive. The author is perfectly at home with the literature of his subject. He has read widely, especially in the German, and his own conclusions give evidence of independent research and careful reflection. His style is all that could be desired, and the same may be said of the arrangement of his material. There is a wealth of interesting information in the book, and "for the tremendous, thrilling sweep of development" of the prophetic religion, especially as represented by Isaiah and Jeremiah, the author manifests a genuine enthusiasm. As a compact, scholarly, lucid, and critical exposition of Israel's religious development down to the Exile the

book has a distinct place of its own. Another volume dealing with the exilic and post-exilic period is promised us, which we shall await with interest.

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COMPARATIVE RELIGION; ITS ADJUNCTS AND ALLIES. LOUIS HENRY JORDAN. Oxford University Press. 1915. Pp. xxxii, 574.

Mr. Jordan's views about what he calls "Comparative Religion" have been set forth many times and in many places. It is — or must be made — "a separate and self-governing discipline," emancipated from its ancillary relation to theology, philosophy, or history, and sharply distinguished from anthropology, sociology, mythology, philology, psychology, and above all, from the history of religions, which are, in his classification, only subsidiary disciplines to Comparative Religion. This science, which as yet exists only as a programme, will be characterized by a systematic and thorough-going application of the comparative method to the material furnished by descriptive and historical studies of religions and religious phenomena, and will have for its distinctive end to discover the laws of religious development and to appraise the values of religions or particular aspects of religion — theology, ethics, ritual, and the like. This task has sometimes been taken to itself by the philosophy of religion, but Mr. Jordan denies alike its right and its competence to deal with such matters. How much more successfully the so-called "science" of Comparative Religion will deal with them remains to be seen.

The volume before us, devoted to the "Adjuncts and Allies" of Comparative Religion, contains reviews and observations upon the recent literature in anthropology and ethnology, sociology, archaeology, mythology, philology, psychology, the history of religions, and methods in the study of religion, with a conspectus of the publications of learned societies, encyclopædias, and periodicals, dealing with these subjects. In an introduction to each of these subdivisions, Mr. Jordan undertakes to define the proper scope of the discipline under consideration and its relation to Comparative Religion proper; and at the end of each group of reviews is a bibliographical list of other literature in the same field. The principal value of the book lies in this convenient and fairly comprehensive conspectus of the literature of the past six or eight years. The re-

views themselves have no great critical significance, but they will ordinarily serve to give the reader a reasonably correct impression of the character and contents of the work.

This is, however, not always the case. A conspicuous example is the relatively extended review of Roemer's book on the Babi-Bahai. Roemer digested with great diligence, so far as could be done without first-hand acquaintance with the Arabic and Persian texts, the historical sources from which our knowledge of this new religion is derived and the voluminous literature to which it has given rise; he presents in extremely condensed form the history and teaching of the Bab and of Baha Allah. It is one of those books which it is a penance to read, but the facts are there; and it is only just to Roemer to say that the errors in which Mr. Jordan's review abounds are derived from other sources. That the Bab was martyred in 1852 (*sic*), and that Subh-i-Ezel died in Cyprus in 1902, are slips not adapted to inspire confidence in Mr. Jordan's familiarity with the subject. Much more serious is the pervasive misapprehension of the character of the new religion. To think that the Babi sect "originated in an effort to reform Islam" is to misunderstand the movement from beginning to end. Equally erroneous is the assertion: "The central doctrine of Bahaism, as expounded in its current and latest form, is the essential unity of all religions. All men are brothers, and at root all religions are one. Hence the central aim of Bahaism is the spiritual unification of mankind. It is emphatically a missionary religion, and in theory at least it is a broadly democratic faith." For this definition the late Professor Cheyne is cited in the footnote; but Mr. Jordan might have learned from the translation which Roemer gives of the first sentence of the Bahai Scriptures, the Kitab Akdas, that the "central dogma" of Bahaism is something very different, namely, that God himself was manifest in a fuller and higher sense than ever before in the person of Baha Allah; he is the consummate manifestation — or, as we should say, incarnation — of the Godhead; and, *second*, that absolute submission of the intellect as well as of the will to this manifest Godhead is the condition *sine qua non* of salvation—"A man cannot take one without the other." When Mr. Jordan writes, therefore, "It is generally understood that Baha Allah regarded himself and is today to be regarded by the faithful as a veritable incarnation of God himself," he reduces the fundamental dogma of the religion to a pious, but supererogatory, opinion. The sentences, again, which speak of the tendency of Bahaism "to over-exalt Mohammed, and to put Jesus in a distinctly secondary place" show that the author has not comprehended the de-

pendence of Bahaism on the ultra-Shi'a doctrine of the serial progressive manifestations of the Supreme Intelligence. I have dwelt longer on this example than its intrinsic importance would demand, because, with Roemer's book in hand, Mr. Jordan repeats the common errors which Roemer labored so hard to eradicate. Bahaism is so interesting and important a phenomenon that it deserves better treatment than it receives from its opponents and particularly from its panegyrists.

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The Study of Religions. Stanley A. Cook, Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, England. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. xxiv, 439.

The object of this volume is to examine general laws of the progress of religious thought and religions in the world. A partial epitome of the argument is given in the author's article, "The Evolution and Survival of Primitive Thought," in *Essays and Studies presented to William Ridgeway* (Cambridge University Press, 1913). The two lines of thought dealt with are the development of religious ideas and the attitude of the individual toward these ideas, especially such as differ from his own. The main thesis of the work is the relation between the individual and his environment.

All progress is through individuals, and the environment is made up of individuals; but the individual is largely shaped by his environment, and this latter, by reason of the fusion of all elements in a community, has a character of its own and may be treated as, in a sort, a separate power. It moves forward as a whole, but its components have each its own rate and character of movement; one part may change considerably while another part may appear to remain stationary, though no part is really completely stationary. As the genesis of any body of thought goes back to an indefinite antiquity, it is necessary for the investigator of any one period to take into account and treat sympathetically all preceding stadia.

For example, what are called "survivals" are not to be regarded as ideas thrust inorganically into an advanced system; rather they are conceptions which, meeting some felt need, have maintained themselves, generally however under new forms. Thus, the old local gods appear in some forms of Christianity and Mohammedanism as saints, able to help and worthy to receive religious worship. So it is with certain cases of apparent retrogression, which are merely the retention of lower ideas by a community not yet prepared to

adopt the ideas of a superior community. A similar explanation applies to phenomena sometimes described as a return to early thought. What really happens is the recognition, always however under different forms, of the validity of certain conceptions as having their roots in human nature. The environment moves slowly and cautiously—men demand continuity in the experiences of life and wish to find their thoughts expressed in the remote past; legal fictions are invented in order to avoid a break with the past; ancient personages are invested with the ideas of later times, and speeches expressing the views of some late historian are put into their mouths.

By reason of the great power of the environment, Cook goes on to say, the influence of personalities is not so great as is sometimes assumed; for every reformer is the product of his social surroundings, and is successful only when these are favorable to his thought. As to the investigator, he must isolate himself, must work out his special point without restraint from others; he cannot, for example, permit himself to be deflected by consideration of the possible consequences of his results. But this isolation is itself a limitation. He, to be sure, is impelled by a force to carry on his researches, but there are other forces at work. Every special study is linked to many others; and just as *esprit de corps* is a psychical reality, so the consciousness of intellectual surroundings is a reality—ideal complete thought can be found only in an ideal individual. Regard for authority is not a survival, it is an element of human nature. And society is always divided into groups; every man belongs to some one group, and it is the extension of the mental areas of groups that tends to produce general harmony. No man can look on his own position as final. It does not follow that a non-religious attitude is the culmination of the advancing thought of an individual or of a nation.

These and kindred topics are illustrated by Mr. Cook from various communal and individual religious experiences. He does not discuss the origin of religion or the histories of systems of religion, nor does he indicate his own preferences beyond the statement that he is in sympathy with the doctrine of evolution and with the methods and results of modern criticism of the Old Testament, and beyond a suggestion that wide comparison may point to the superiority of Christianity over other religions. He inculcates the virtues of historical knowledge, self-knowledge, caution, honesty, and humility —qualities that are universally considered to be necessary to the critic, but are not always apparent in critical writings. The volume

has many interesting remarks, and will be found useful by all students of religions.

Crawford H. Toy.

Harvard University.

The Renaissance, the Protestant Revolution, and the Catholic Reformation in Continental Europe. Edward Maslin Hulme. The Century Co. 1915. Pp. 629.

This book has certain rather striking qualities. It is built upon a well-conceived ground-plan, for which the author expresses his obligations to Professor George L. Burr of Cornell. Its selection of topics to be treated with greater or less fulness shows care and judgment, though such selection is a matter about which no two scholars could ever entirely agree. The point of view is liberal and fair toward all varieties of human effort. On all the numerous subjects passed in review—politics, religion, economic problems, science, literature, art—the author shows a comprehension adequate for his purpose. His style is uncommonly good, clear, and concise, but at the same time enlivened by a prevailing sense of form. Only rarely is he betrayed into fine writing, and such betrayal only hints at the restraint he has elsewhere put upon himself. The general accuracy of statement is shown by frequent but not burdensome reference to authorities and by brief discussion of controverted points.

With all these virtues must be mentioned one or two equally pronounced faults. The plan, excellent as it is, is too complete. A book of this size built upon such a plan must be too inclusive to make an incisive impression. It is seldom worth while to try to say something about everything; but if one must do that, the only safe way is to limit the field. Here the field is very large, and for that reason the treatment, to be effective, should be by careful exposition of leading ideas and typical personalities rather than by any balancing of quantities. One feels that the author is better than his work, and would be glad to have him try his hand at a more specific task. Meanwhile, the volume fills a unique place in the current literature of the Reformation period, and cannot fail to be of service to readers who wish to gain a general view of causes and consequences in that momentous struggle.

Ephraim Emerton.

Harvard University.

THE RISE OF MODERN RELIGIOUS IDEAS. ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT, D.D. The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. xiv, 315. $1.50.

This volume sketches the rise of modern religious ideas in two books—the first a brief one, pertaining to the disintegration of the old, and the second at much greater length presenting reconstruction and the introduction of the new. It has arisen out of a course of the Earl Lectures given at the Pacific Theological Seminary, and seems to indicate a change in the character of the lectureship from the more popular and practical to the more professional. It is marked by the comprehensive learning for which Professor McGiffert has been well known ever since his edition of Eusebius.

Under the head of disintegration, Dr. McGiffert tells the story of German pietism as personified in Spener. He then passes to the movement beginning about 1750 which is technically called the "Enlightenment." The chapter on Natural Science which follows is comprehensive and excellent, showing very plainly how the free use of the human faculties led, under the influence of the new discoveries, to a questioning principally of the miraculous element in the popular theology, not without tendencies to question also the existence of such a God as Christianity taught. Last comes a brief sketch of the critical philosophy from Descartes to Kant.

With the second book, upon Reconstruction, the author enters upon a more congenial task. Under the successive heads of the Emancipation of Religion, the Rebirth of Speculation, the Rehabilitation of Faith, Agnosticism, Evolution, Divine Immanence, Ethical Theism, the Character of God, the Social Emphasis, and Religious Authority, we are presented with a sketch of philosophical and doctrinal history in which the great names are brought forward in due order and the main great lines of thought are certainly indicated with clearness and often with considerable fulness of treatment. Possibly a sufficiently comprehensive idea of the actual contents and excellences of the work may be conveyed as we go on, if we proceed at once to particulars in respect to which certain criticism seems to be called for.

Perhaps we are mistaken in our understanding of the purpose of the book, but we suppose its theme to be American Modern Ideas. At least that would seem to be the proper subject of a book produced under the circumstances under which this was produced. And we cannot believe that we are wrong in understanding our author as laying chief stress, among such ideas, upon the rejection of external authority and the substitution for it of internal experience and con-

viction in religion, upon the rejection of the old view of the miraculous, and upon exaltation to a new plane of communion with God as the essence of religion. It is our conviction that with the genesis of *these* ideas, much that Dr. McGiffert brings before us has nothing to do, and much that is of the greatest actual importance in the history he has said nothing about. It is natural that one educated in Germany should believe in the supreme importance of German philosophical and theological development as the foundation of all present creative thinking. Have not the Germans themselves told us so, with an almost absolute ignoring of all thought not their own? But it is very doubtful whether the course of English and American thought has been seriously modified by many German thinkers who have, it is true, anticipated the formative ideas which have arisen among us but can scarcely be shown to have positively influenced us. William James once said that Kant himself had not seriously affected English philosophy, which was on the sure path to the attainment of all he produced even before his day, and which was compelled, as James phrased it, "to make its way around Kant, as the mountain stream makes its way around the boulder which has fallen into its channel and choked it." Emerson's actual indebtedness to German transcendentalism is rather mythical. Henry B. Smith, though he thought he was greatly influenced by Germany, and no doubt was, so far as scholarship is concerned, still gives little evidence in his published fragments of any important modification in the system of thought which he drew directly from his New England teachers. Dr. McGiffert has given us an excellent and appreciative account of the great formative ideas of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, the heads of the line of thought which he has for many years favored. In his treatment of Ritschl in particular he has given a clearer and juster view than we remember to have seen elsewhere. But it is doubtful whether either of these theologians has exercised much influence in America. Most of those who have talked about Ritschl have misunderstood him; and in this day we no longer hear much about him. Egbert Smyth in 1877 left the impression that Ritschl was a pillar of orthodoxy.

The great and important fact, which too remote historical discussion is only adapted to obscure, is that the main swelling stream of modern, reconstructive religious thought, so far as the English-speaking world is concerned, sprang from the publication in 1859 of Darwin's *Origin of Species*. Previous suggestions of evolution have an antiquarian interest, but they have little vital connection with the subsequent thinking. If the history of evolution in

America is to be told, then the hasty and blunt verdict upon it by Charles Hodge—"atheism"—the explanatory advocation by Asa Gray, and the general hospitality towards it which was shown by Congregationalists, are of the first importance. But of these Dr. McGiffert says nothing. And it would seem as though it were not an unprofitable line of historical investigation to discuss why Congregationalists were as hospitable as they were. It would then appear that in the long development of "the New England Theology," technically so called, and in the Unitarian movement, Congregationalists had learned these great and liberating things—that the Calvinistic theology of Geneva was not final and authoritative, that much could be learned from adversaries, that the fundamental elements of religion are vital, spiritual processes (see N. W. Taylor, long anterior to Ritschl), and that progress in theology is to be expected and labored for. These were the preparation for evolution and biblical criticism, and for the dynamic rather than the static view of the universe.

We hope the book will pass to a second edition, and that Dr. McGiffert will extend his view to the fields suggested, and to others, and give us thus a still more vital history of the actual growth of our American system of thought, now in process of rapid development among us.

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The Sequel to Catholic Emancipation, 1830–1850. Monsignor Bernard Ward. Longmans & Co. 1915. Two Vols. Pp. Vol. I, xx, 296. Vol. II, viii, 328. $6.00.

These volumes complete the *Memoires pour servir* in which the President of St. Edmund's has embodied the record of the English Catholics body from the death of Bishop Challoner (1781) to the establishment of the hierarchy (1850). The work has been done with accuracy, candor, and judgment. Mgr. Ward is to be congratulated on having brought to so successful an issue an undertaking which fills a gap in English Church history, and which both from his position and his family associations he was singularly qualified to carry out.

The political element in English Catholicism which had brought the Catholics into conflict with the Government disappeared after 1688. The disabilities under which they lay from an odious necessity had become an odious survival, injurious both to those who suffered under them and to those in whose supposed interest they were

maintained. The provincialism of English religion, Protestant and Catholic, not wholly extinct even to-day, is the result of the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and antagonism which prevailed among us for more than three hundred years. In 1829 the English Catholics were still, in the strict sense of the word, a missionary body. They were governed by four Vicars Apostolic, i.e. bishops holding delegate jurisdiction from the Pope and taking their titles from extinct sees *in partibus infidelium*—Dr. Wiseman e.g. was bishop of Melipotamus, a city in Crete erected into a bishopric in the ninth century—and these quaint appellations made them appear more foreign than in fact they were. In many ways, indeed, they were *ultra* English — Milner, the author of the *End of Controversy*, in spite of his outlandish style, Bishop of Castabala, was a typical Georgian Tory and John Bull. The clergy, who had been originally chaplains attached either to the embassies or the great Catholic families, though they performed parochial duties, had neither the status nor the security of tenure of parish priests; and this anomaly, though its removal formed part of the project for reorganization put forward in 1815 by Bishop Poynter, remains to the present time. There was a quiet goodness in this old English Catholicism which had, and has, a peculiar charm. The ways of the Vicars Apostolic were simple and their lives retired. W. H. Brockfield describes "the R. C. Bishop of London" — so he styles Dr. Griffiths — as carrying his bag from the Piccadilly omnibus to his house in Golden Square. "A very pleasing, venerable, episcopal-looking man, very much like any other Bishop; save that none of ours would touch a carpet bag with his little finger." This last touch has perhaps ceased to apply. But the times had got beyond them. The Irish immigration; the convert movement; the greater facilities of communication with Rome, which increased centralization and made the intervention of Propaganda in English affairs more frequent than had formerly been possible — all this produced a situation with which these modest home-bred prelates were scarcely qualified to deal. Their want of acquaintance with the forms of the Roman Curia prejudiced them in the eyes of its officials; Dr. Griffiths, till he succeeded Bishop Bramston as Vicar Apostolic of the London District, had never been out of England in his life. And while they submitted themselves to the directions of "Hilltown" — as Rome was then called — they neither invited nor welcomed them. Their communications with Gregory XVI. suggest rather those between Innocent XI. and the Gallican prelates of his period than those which we may imagine to take place between a Pope and a diocesan bishop today. Gregory had

animadverted with asperity on a Pastoral Letter of Bishop Baines (1840); and, judging the Bishop's explanation inadequate, roundly charged him with "boasting and untruthfulness, from which great dishonour to the Apostolic See and the Christian religion may arise." The Bishop held his own, but with difficulty; for he narrowly, it seems, escaped deprivation. His example was held *in terrorem* over actual or possible delinquents however eminent. "It was the punishment of Bishop Baines to keep him at the door of Propaganda for a year," wrote Newman in 1863; adding — for he was in the worst possible odor at Rome at the time — "This is the prospect which I cannot but feel probable, did I say anything which one Bishop chose to speak against and report. Others have been killed before me." (*Life of Cardinal Newman.* Wilfrid Ward. I, 588.) Already under Gregory the weatherwise could foresee the tyranny which in the disastrous reign of Pius IX. swept away national and local usage, divorced the clerical from the lay mind, and under the pretext of unity made Catholicism a Roman rather than a world-wide or even a European force.

It was a time of stir and expansion. This was felt even in land-locked waters. What would come of it? Men saw visions and dreamed dreams. The Gothic revival was one of the many symbols of the prevailing enthusiasm. Pugin's *Architectural Contrasts* — a book which it should pay a modern publisher to reproduce, and from which Mgr. Ward gives us a characteristic illustration (that of the Chapels Royal at Windsor and at Brighton) — is a key to much that was in men's minds. Pugin was an enthusiast. He confused preference with principle. "How can you expect to convert England if you wear a cope like that?" he remonstrated with a friend who wore one of a Roman pattern; and the comment of a satirist on his extravagance was —

> "The Catholic Church, she never knew
> Till Mr. Pugin taught her
> That true religion had to do
> At all with bricks and mortar!"

He would tolerate none but Gothic furniture; and his cook made his creams and jellies in Gothic moulds. When his wife, to his great satisfaction, was received into the Catholic Church, "the ceremony was grand and awfully impressive," said the local paper. "From either extremity of the side-galleries was extended across the chapel a handsome and tasty festoon of flowerets, from the centre of which was suspended a crown of the same materials directly over the head

of the convert." It must have been a grotesque sight. But he was a great artist; and his principle — that of the decoration as opposed to the concealment of construction (compare the Gothic timber roof with the flat ceiling or double dome of a classical building) — was sound.

Mgr. Ward's readers will be frequently reminded that we live in changed times. The service at the consecration of Bishop Griffiths (1833) occupied five hours; the dinner after the opening of Pugin's cathedral at Birmingham six. Dr. Wiseman often preached for two hours on end. The Bavarian Chapel was known as "The Shilling Opera" — a shilling being the charge of admission to the principal Sunday mass. A Catholic journal (1839) describes the performance:

> "Signor Rubini sang the admired *Quoniam* with great effect. It was more like the warbling of a bird than mere singing, for it must have astonished as well as delighted the whole congregation, among whom were many Protestants. To say the most of the *Credo* in a few words, it excelled the *Gloria*, and was supported by Madame Persiani and Signor Tamburini, who came in during the sermon."

The "Goths" protested; plain-song and the pointed arch were twin sisters, and the good sense of men of the type of Lingard demurred:

> "Has it not been our fate to hear a soprano *Incarnatus* attempted in falsetto by the bass voice of an eminent comic singer, whose very face irresistibly called up associations of mirth and conviviality? Have we not seen with our own eyes eminent 'artistes' walk arm in arm, and with much seeming gravity and decorum, into the choir of a London Chapel, although these very parties were at the time labouring under the world's imputation of living together in a state unhallowed alike by the laws of God and man?"

*Magis planctus quam cantus* is St. Augustine's rule for church music. Perhaps there is something to be said even for plain-song! But we live in more decorous days.

Another type of absurdity was presented by the Romanizers. Faber spoke and wrote of the Blessed Virgin as "dearest Mamma"; the Anglican Church, whose ministers many of them had been, was "Mother Damnable"; its clergy were "Bonzes"; its Eucharist "the Bread and Wine." He wore the Oratorian dress in public: "I walk down the street in my habit; and I feel that I dispel invincible ignorance wherever I go." The cult was one of sheer brutality. One of Faber's disciples, hearing of the death of a Protestant relative, made the announcement, "My sister is jolly well damned." The comment of Anatole France on religion of this sort suggests itself:

"C'est ridicule; mais c'est odieux." Their indiscriminate idealizing brought "the ways of Rome" into contempt.

"The more extreme Romanizers even imitated the slovenliness prevalent there. They would celebrate mass in a rapid and careless manner, and would talk freely at the altar or in choir. Some even went such lengths as to spit in the Church, a practise which they said denoted the feeling of being at home there which a Catholic should have. One well-known convert allowed a small dog to run about his Church, declaring that the collar-bells had a devotional effect — his real reason being that in Rome dogs are not excluded from the churches."

From the Reformation downwards there has been a persistent though thin stream — perhaps a more accurate word would be dribble — of secessions to Rome. The larger body attracts the smaller; and Catholicism appeals to certain temperaments outside it very much as the Synagogue appealed to the "foolish Galatians" of the Apostolic age. Tractarianism was the outcome of this attraction. Great as was the contrast between the two, it had points of contact with the Evangelicalism of the previous generation — an infallible book demands an infallible interpreter; and the Romantic movement gave it impetus; *in Tiberim defluxit Orontes;* the muddy Tiber received the muddier waters of the Thames. There were Catholics who viewed the transformation of the National Church with suspicion; it was Satan transforming himself into an angel of light. There were others who welcomed it with enthusiasm, and saw in it the promise of a second Spring. The most extravagant expectations were formed; the return of England to the Church, it was believed, was imminent. Pretended prophecies passed from mouth to mouth. It was an age of stigmatized nuns and thaumaturgist friars, of omens, miracles, charms, and amulets; an orgy of spiritual exaltation set in. The Vicars Apostolic, to their credit, set themselves against these follies. A letter written by Dr. Griffiths to Prince Hohenlohe (1842) dwells upon what has been since called the "leakage" — "we annually lose many Catholics from neglect" — and adds that "when we look at the whole population and consider the progress of conversions, we cannot say that there is a reasonable prospect of England's return to the Church of Christ." And in a Pastoral (1841) — "Scarcely shall we find a body of schismatics returning with sincerity to the true faith." Gregory XVI., who, in the little leisure which the misgovernment of his subjects left him, dabbled in pietism, was indignant, and in a letter addressed to the London clergy allowed himself to apply the

"Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis"

of the poet to their Bishop. But the event demonstrated the fallibility of the Infallible. The Bishop was right, and the Pope wrong.

The converts were accustomed to draw invidious comparisons between the intellectual attainments which they believed themselves to possess and the alleged ignorance of the old Catholics. Such comparisons, the bad taste of which was obvious, were unjustified. The Oxford Movement as a whole lay outside the mind of its generation; the trained intellect of the time — the representatives of English speculation and science, the historians, the poets, the men of letters — passed it by. In the sense in which the word is used today neither the converts nor the old Catholics were educated; in its more restricted signification the advantage was at least not obviously on the side of the converts. Newman was the one great figure of whom they could boast; but, man of genius as he was, his knowledge, even for his time, was limited. Lingard, on the other hand, was a man of genuine learning; it is probable that he had forgotten more than all the converts put together had ever known. His opinion of the neophytes was poor. "Their Greek," he declared, "was confined to one branch of the language"— the composition of iambics —"and their Latin was as a rule beneath contempt."

In one respect the old Catholics were at a disadvantage. They had retained the less accentuated aspirate of an earlier generation; and their pronunciation was apt to degenerate, even in men of good social position, into the habitual omission of the letter H. The late excellent Bishop Ullathorne was an example. An ill-trained acolyte, being directed at a function to put on the mitre, himself assumed the episcopal headgear. The Bishop interposed: "Not on your 'ead; on my 'ead." Nor did he confine himself to the omission of this unfortunate letter where custom prescribes it; he would supply it where it was not required. He once found himself, it was said, in a railway carriage with Samuel Wilberforce, who, seeing his dress, remarked, "I think we are both Bishops." "*Hi* am a Bishop," was the emphatic answer; and the conversation dropped. On Wiseman's death his name was spoken of in connection with the Archbishopric of Westminster; but Propaganda was informed that this trick of pronunciation would make the appointment undesirable. Cardinal Barnabò, then Prefect of Propaganda, enjoyed the joke hugely. "C' e una certa lettera *Acca*" (H), he went about saying, "la mancanza di cui e un peccato mortale fra gli Inglesi"; and, the Italian H being silent, he regarded this as an additional proof that the English were mad. But Manning got the preferment. "Events momentous spring from causes least." It is one of the

ironies of history that a possibly not unimportant factor in the Vatican Definition of Papal Infallibility, in which the convert Archbishop played so prominent a part, was Dr. Ullathorne's misplacement of the letter H.

A more important matter was the relation between English and Irish Catholics. During the struggle for emancipation they had, though not without difficulty, made common cause. After 1829 they fell apart; the English, with the majority of the converts, being conservatives, and the Irish, though not in any sense Liberals, democratic. The English Catholics bitterly opposed the land agitation in Ireland, and professed to be scandalized by the indifference of the Irish clergy to the crimes by which this agitation was accompanied; the Irish charged the English with ingratitude. The *Tablet* — *quantum mutatus!* — under Lucas denounced the Catholic families as "a corrupt heap of religious indifference, of half-faith, of cowardice, of selfishness, of unmanly impotence." This antagonism remains to this day; and, as the great majority of Catholics living in England are either Irish or of Irish origin, no little friction has been, and is, the result. At a meeting of a Catholic conference in a northern industrial centre it was thought impossible a few years ago to have the National Anthem played. In the present war the Irish, with few exceptions, are stanch in their support of the British Empire; and it may be hoped that under new conditions the division which separates the two sections of the Catholic community may be overcome. But tact is called for; and tact is a rare quality. It cannot be said that it has always been shown on either side.

The leading figure of Mgr. Ward's period (1830–50) is undoubtedly that of Dr. Wiseman. It is difficult for those whose knowledge of the Cardinal comes from the record of his later years, when his energy was impaired and his health failing, to realize how able and distinguished a man he was. Born in Spain of Anglo-Irish parents, educated at Waterford, at Ushaw, and finally at the English College at Rome, of which he was President (1828–40), his reputation for scholarship — he was an Orientalist of some distinction — brought him into contact with foreigners of note who visited Italy; and his duties as agent for the English Vicars Apostolic gave him a considerable acquaintance both with English Catholicism and in general with affairs. No preparation could have been better calculated to qualify him for the high office which he was to fill in later life. The various forces whose action and reaction affected the Catholic community in this country — Irish and English, Catholic and convert,

Gothic and Roman, foreign and domestic — he was at home with and had personal knowledge of them all. No one else could have held them in hand, and to no one man does English Catholicism owe so great a debt.

Browning's Bishop Blougram, of which he was the original, did him an injustice; he was a sincerely religious man. He had, however, certain palpable foibles—there was a lobster-salad side to him, it was said, as well as an ascetic; and his undisguised delight in the state and paraphernalia of the Cardinalate gave a certain plausibility to the picture, by which he was deeply mortified, and of whose unfairness those who knew him best were best aware. Perhaps no better illustration of his two sides could be given than, on the one hand, his famous pastoral "Out of the Flaminian Gate of Rome" (1850)—windy, bombastic, and pretentious; and on the other hand, his later *Appeal to the English People*, whose vigorous good sense went far to atone for the original error in taste and judgment.

The epigram of Robert Scott, the lexicographer, on the new hierarchy may be quoted in conclusion.

> Cum Sapiente Pius nostras juravit in aras.
> Impius, heu Sapiens! insipiensque Pius!

It may be thus Englished:

> Pius and Wiseman 'gainst our altars rise.
> Oh unwise Pius! and oh impious Wise!

With the establishment of the diocesan episcopate a new era opened; the traditions of "the persecuted remnant" were closed.

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Lives of the English Martyrs. Second Series. The Martyrs declared Venerable. Vol. I. 1583–1588. Edited by Edwin H. Burton, D.D., and J. H. Pollen, S.J. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1914. Pp. xxxix, 583. $2.50.

The men whose tragic fate is here described were certainly in a position of as great difficulty as have been any in the history of the church. Convinced of the necessity for salvation of Roman obedience and anxious to minister its sole life-giving sacraments, as they esteemed them, to the persecuted adherents of Rome in their native

land, they were willing to risk all for the fulfilment of the task. Yet their ecclesiastical sovereign, by a bull of 1570, had declared Queen Elizabeth excommunicate and deposed; in 1579 he had aided an Irish invasion; and eminent English Catholics on the Continent, like Robert Parsons, were doing their utmost to encourage an invasion of England by the forces of Philip II — an invasion which most observers, in England and outside, believed would be irresistible, till the destruction of the Armada in 1588 proved its futility. That King had shown his disposition, in 1584, by furthering the murder of William the Silent, and conspiracies against the life of Elizabeth were occasionally discovered. No wonder English Protestanism looked upon these missionaries with profound suspicion. Nor can one be surprised that, when apprehended, these priests were usually asked the "bloody question," which the editors of this volume declare to have been illegal. Whether illegal or not, it was the most natural of inquiries under the circumstances: "Should England be invaded in the interest of the Catholic faith, which side would you take, that of the Queen or of her enemies?" An answer satisfactory to Protestants was most difficult to an earnest Catholic of that age.

Yet it is now evident that the men whose lives and sufferings are so touchingly commemorated in this volume were, possibly without exception, no plotters against the government, and simply and sincerely interested in the cure of souls, as they understood it. Their complete success would have been, indeed, the overthrow of Elizabeth's rule; but that was, one may say, a by-product rather than their direct aim. Even a Protestant, in whose veins runs the blood of the Puritans, will not grudge his tribute of praise to a devotion which was faithful unto death and to which the preservation of the Roman Church in England was due. He may deem them mistaken, but he will hardly regret the title "Venerable" bestowed upon them by the late Pope Leo XIII.

The sketches are by many hands, but have been drawn with much painstaking accuracy, if from a decidedly Roman point of view. The Introduction reflects the well-known scholarship of its authors.

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THE ENGLISH RITE. Being a Synopsis of the Sources and Revisions of the Book of Common Prayer. With an Introduction and an Appendix. F. E. BRIGHTMAN. Rivingtons. 1915. 2 Vols. Pp. Vol. I, ccxxx, 453. Vol. II, 454–1068. 42*s*.

These huge volumes contain a vast amount of valuable matter and witness to almost incalculable labor of an exacting kind. More than a thousand (to be exact, 1017) of the pages numbered in Arabic are devoted to a "synopsis" or parallel column view of three editions of the English Prayer Book, those of 1549, 1552, and 1661; a fourth column (which actually stands first) being devoted to "sources." The changes introduced into the book at the revisions of 1559 and 1604 are noted by reference numbers, as are also variations in different editions of the Elizabethan and Jacobean books, and the matter derived from the Scottish book of 1637 and from the collections and suggestions of Bishop Cosin and Bishop Wren and the non-conformists at the Savoy Conference. In the column of sources, the text of Latin originals and that of German originals is distinguished by a difference of type; Gothic letters indicate the particular Latin sources, and abbreviations tell of the earliest (extant) texts — Gelasian or Gregorian or Leonine or Menardian — in which each item is found, while antique letters refer the items from the German to their several originals. In the three columns of successive texts four styles of type are used, each in two sizes, for (1) matter other than translation from the Bible, which existed before 1549 in an independent form and was incorporated in the book of that date; (2) matter of 1549; (3) matter of 1552; (4) matter again other than translations from the Bible, of a date later than 1552. In all this we are reminded of Maskell's *Liturgiae Britannicae;* and the simpler arrangement and less particular form of the older book will seem to many students still to commend it for every practical use. Perhaps the example which is really the test of the book of 1559, the form of words at the administration of the consecrated elements in the Communion Office, shows best the difference in the methods of the two editors. Maskell, who put the books of 1552 and 1559 into one column and those of 1604 and 1637 (Scottish) into another, printed separately the simply commemorative forms of the second Edwardine book and the combined Elizabethan forms, making the change of words and its date perfectly clear; Brightman brings the words of 1549 over into the 1661 column, the numeral '1' before them and the asterisk after them indicating to the reader (who, if he does not remember their meaning, must turn back from

page 701 to page ii in the other volume,) that the restoration was really made in 1559, more than a century before the date at the head of the column. So it is with the additions to the Catechism; they stand under 1661, and only an inconspicuous "4" on page 787 and a "*" on page 791 tell us that they date from 1604. The reader recognizes that the most laborious pains have been taken to note every variation of typography, even printers' slips and irregularities of spelling and indications of personal equation and devices to secure "justification," most of which have not the slightest literary or historical meaning. And in this connection we have to note great waste of space. It is interesting indeed to read the epistles and gospels in the Great Bible version from which they were taken until 1661 and compare their wording with that of the King James version which was substituted for it at that date, and also to have before the eye the Vulgate text in which these Lessons were read in the Sarum Use, noting the differences in length and other variations; but to print all the epistles and gospels in English at full length, once for 1549 and once for 1552, where the variations, in large part due to carelessness or accident, were only those of two editions of the same English version, and to note every least divergence, appears unnecessarily "meticulous." And to print all the introits in full in the 1549 column, leaving (of course) the other columns blank, adds to the conviction that the book has been unnecessarily padded; for the collects, introits, epistles, and gospels of the week before Easter use up seventy-nine pages. The editor himself evidently felt that this fulness of printing must be in some wise restrained; for the Psalter is represented under 1661 by the title of the book, the title and the first verse of the first psalm, a line of dots, and the last verse of the one hundred and fiftieth psalm; and we have to look elsewhere for the original text of the whole book of Psalms.

Thus far what has been written by way of criticism may seem rather ungracious as spent upon the result of great labor on the part of a scholar who must have found delight in it. But something must be said as to the column of "sources," in which this work differs from that of Maskell, and which shows that it has a wider and more helpful purpose. Even here we are disappointed at finding that the source given in each instance is the proximate source rather than the original. The prayer of St. Chrysostom indeed is printed in the Greek; but the source of *Gloria in excelsis* is given as the Latin text in the missal with a note after *hominibus bonae voluntatis*, "S. Luk. ii. 14 unto men a good wyll," but no indication that the translation

in this phrase was from the Greek text of the time; and the Nicene Creed is given in Latin, not in Greek, though it seems certain, as Bishop Dowden has shown, that Cranmer was led by a faulty Greek text to omit "holy" from the marks of the Church. In the Burial of the Dead the sequence *Media vita* is given in Latin, with a reference for the first clause to Job xiv and to the lesson in the old office; but for the rest no source is given except the compline service of the third Sunday in Lent in Sarum Use, and we are not pointed to the Greek "Trisagion" from which "Agios o theos" was taken. We have no help for finding the biblical sources of the versicles and responses at Morning and Evening Prayer, or the biblical and patristic sources of the several parts of the *Te Deum;* while the attribution of the sources of the prayer of consecration in the Communion service is confused and unsatisfactory. But all the proximate attribution of sources is interesting; and in particular the inexperienced student will be surprised to see how much was derived from German (or, as the word was used then, Dutch) formularies; not indeed in matters relating to doctrine but in forms of words, especially exhortations and the like. (Again, it would seem that this ought not to have extended so far as to give the source of the gospel in the Baptism of Infants in a German translation.)

It remains to speak of the learned historical introduction to the work, and of the notes contained in it and following it on "the result of the revisions."

Beginning with a concise sketch of the way in which by the beginning of the sixteenth century the Roman rite had come to prevail throughout the West, of the groups of books in which it was contained, and the sacramentaries in which we can to some extent trace its history, the author shows that "the course of things in England was parallel to what it was elsewhere and the resulting situation was the same." The position held by the Use of Sarum is noticed as testified by the fact that before the year 1545 the Missal of that Use had been printed in 48 editions, the Portuis in 48, and the Primer in about 170. Mention is made of the so-called Gallican use in its Ambrosian and its Mozarabic forms, and of the liturgy of the orthodox East in the Byzantine service-books. The movements for liturgical reform are noted, with special mention of the Breviary of Quiñones, of which more than a hundred editions were published within thirty years; and the German substitutes, involving presently the use of the vernacular, are treated quite fully. Then along lines which are sufficiently familiar, the English reforms are traced from the publication of the Great Bible and Marshall's

Primer to the Book of Common Prayer of 1549; and sufficiently full attention is given to the successive revisions until that of 1661. Of special value is section VIII, with its consideration of the "principal sources" — really all the sources — from which the book of 1549 was compiled, biblical and traditional and reformational, and this latter along the three lines of continental Catholic, Anglican, and Lutheran—though, as the author says, there is no Lutheranism in the book.

It may be well to mention the points in which the general character of the new rite is noted, namely: The books are reduced to three — the Bible, the Psalter, and the one volume of breviary, processional, missal, and manual; the whole is in English; rite and ceremony are simplified; there are no metrical hymns; all benedictions of things, "except of course of the matter of some of the sacraments," are omitted; invocations of saints and allusion to their merits and intercession are excluded; and, as matters of form, the book is printed almost entirely in black and there is no musical notation. A table exhibits the relation of the Divine Service (matins and evensong) of the first book to the traditional service and to contemporary reforms; and in another table the relation of the "Mass" in the same first book to the traditional order and to some Lutheran orders is shown. Section IX on the ordination-book of 1550 is very instructive, with accounts of traditional rites and Bucer's proposed substitute for them. The ritual products of the reign of Elizabeth, the slight changes under James I., and the extensive revision after the Restoration are all treated in a careful way, the antecedents and the results being as thoroughly studied and discussed as the limitations of the work allow.

The Notes, which are printed as parts of the Introduction, and not as conspicuously as their importance would warrant, consist of a great number of paragraphs, each referred to its page in the four-column "synopsis." They have a wide range of history, explanation, comparison, and criticism, and must all be read by any one who would appreciate their varying value. Some examples may be given as in a way illustrating all. Under the year 1549, with a reference to pp. 200 sq. of the text, is a full scheme of the Introits, with a study of the principles on which they were selected, very curious, not to say ingenious. Presently we find, "p. 220, Collect; see *Journal of Theol. Studies* xiii, p. 562"; and turning to page 220, we find that it is the Collect for Christmas Day; but we are not edified. After a while, we are told by a reference to p. 604 (in the other volume) that the Collect for St. Mary Magdalene's

day is "perhaps the worst in the book"; again, referring to the Nicene Creed on p. 648, we have several interesting notices of variations between the originals and the translation, including the omission of "holy" already mentioned. There soon follows an instructive note on the offertory. A long note on the several forms in which the institution of the Eucharist is recorded or recited shows careful study and is of great value; but presently we are rather startled by the expression of an opinion that the blessing — "The peace of God," etc. —"is an anticlimax after communion, and no doubt came into use just because the people had not as a rule communicated in the Mass." The notes on the book of 1661 call attention to "the originally unauthorized insertion of the musical colon in *Te Deum*, to enable it to be sung to a chant, in spite of its structure"; and the remark is ventured that if "all kneeling," before the collects at morning prayer, is intended to include the priest, "it is obviously ridiculous"; while the placing of a prayer for the Sovereign before the collect for the day in the Communion Office is called an "unhappy transference," "a good instance of the profound lack of appreciation, on the part of the Carolines, of the liturgical precedents which on occasion they were fond of invoking."

The intention and purpose of this work, and hardly less their execution, have called for an extended notice, in which perhaps what seem defects and causes of disappointment have been more fully mentioned than have the marks of wide and thorough scholarship furnished very generously with references. But to those who can handle the volumes, verify their historical statements, and judge the opinions expressed in them, they will bring a wealth of special learning not easily exhaustible and not for many a year to be again gathered. A complete index to such a work would be a practical impossibility; but there ought to be a full table of contents for the introduction.

The Appendix treats of two observances which the editor holds to appertain to the integrity of the English rite, though not contained in the Book of Common Prayer — The Bidding of the Bedes and the Rogation Procession; but of these we have not the space to write.

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The Offices of Baptism and Confirmation. The Cambridge Liturgical Handbooks Series. T. Thompson. Cambridge University Press. 1914. Pp. x, 253. 6*s*.

This little book aims to give the history of baptism and confirmation, together with the theological ideas underlying them. It details, for example, the preparation required in the early centuries for baptism, the times at which it was administered, the form of its administration, the attendant ceremonies, the various meanings attached to it. It traces the differences in these respects among the Eastern and Western liturgies. The student is helped by abundant references to original sources, by tables comparing the different liturgies in parallel columns, by an excellent bibliography, and by a judicious index.

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The Freer Gospels (Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature related to the New Testament. First Series, Volume II. Part 3). Edgar J. Goodspeed. The University of Chicago Press. 1914.

The Bixby Gospels (The same, Part 4). Edgar J. Goodspeed. 1915.

To Professor Goodspeed of Chicago has fallen by right of competence and interest the honorable task of examining such New Testament Greek manuscripts as have found their home in this country and in Canada. In former years he has published careful collations of the Gospel manuscript belonging to the Newberry Library, Chicago, and of that in the possession of the University of Toronto. To these are now added a collation of the Freer Gospels (W), of which a superb fac-simile had previously been published by Professor Sanders of Michigan, who has devoted years to the study of the Freer manuscripts. The collation is made with the text of Westcott and Hort, is undoubtedly of the highest accuracy, and will be of much and permanent use to scholars, for they are sure to occupy themselves in the future with this remarkable copy of the Gospels.

The other collation is of a less notable manuscript—an illuminated copy of the Gospels (Gregory, 703) which came from Athos and was purchased from Quaritch in London by Mr. W. K. Bixby of St. Louis. It is an eleventh-century codex, presenting a text of the ordinary type, but with some interesting features. It is well worth while to publish descriptions and collations of such a manu-

script, and American scholars are in duty bound to examine all the copies of the Gospels in this country, no matter how late. The collation is here made, as it ought to be in all such cases, with the Textus Receptus.

One or two formal criticisms may be permitted. It would be convenient to have at least the name of the Gospel, if not the chapter and verse, indicated at the top of each page; and to include the accents, capitals, etc., of the printed edition with which the collation is made is a piece of extra labor that is merely puzzling and not helpful to the user. It is also an inconvenience in a scientific work not to have the date of publication on the title-page.

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The Ethics of Confucius. The Sayings of the Master and his Disciples upon the Conduct of the "Superior Man." Miles Meander Dawson. With a Foreword by Wu Ting Fang. G. Putnam's Sons. 1915. Pp. xxii, 323. $1.50.

This book is worthy of recommendation to Occidental students of the Confucian ethics, as it gives a general survey of the doctrines of the Chinese sage through ample quotations from the different canonical books of Confucianism, which are linked together by the author's explanations. He did well in arranging the topics to be explained according to the so-called "eight principles" in the "Great Learning," one of the Confucian canonical books. These principles enable us to understand that self-realization (or "self-development" as the present author put it) is not the sole aim of Confucian learning, but necessarily leads us to enter into the work of universal realization of virtue, which is to be effected primarily through universal education and proper government.

Apparently the author had not a good command of the Chinese language and has had to depend in his study of the subject on English translations. Some of his misconceptions and oversights were certainly due to this cause. Dr. Legge's translations, which seem to have been the author's main source of knowledge, fail in many cases to give the precise meanings of the original texts, and they scarcely give any of the hints which are so necessary with respect to those points which are subjects of much discussion among Confucian scholars. The very term "superior man," for instance, which the author attaches to the title of his book, stands in Legge's translations for two different Chinese terms, each of which has two

different meanings. Each of the Chinese terms stands, on the one hand, for a man of virtue, and on the other for a man of rank. The distinction becomes quite obscured through the indiscriminate translation of Dr. Legge. The same is true as regards the Chinese phrase which sometimes stands for the heavenly investiture of a sovereign, and at other times for a heavenly mission, a heavenly decree, or fate. Toward the end of his life, Confucius said, "At my fiftieth year I was convinced of my heavenly mission (to illumine the truth and bring peace and welfare to the people)." He came to this conviction as the result of his conviction of his perfect self-realization, and it was the occasion for his immediately devoting himself to the task of universal realization. It marks the turning-point in his life. Without knowing this, we should be at a loss to understand his firm, unshaken faith in Heaven, to which he gave frequent expression, as we find recorded in the Analects. Dr. Legge translated the phrase by the term "decrees of Heaven," and the real meaning of the utterance of Confucius has thereby been lost. Naturally our author was not able to understand the original meaning of the Chinese phrase. What is equally vital is Dr. Legge's way of translating the ideal of Confucius, which is expressed in Chinese by the ideograph "*jen*." Dr. Legge gave four different translations for this single term — good, benevolence, virtue, and perfect virtue. So far as the respective texts are concerned, his translations of "*jen*" by these different terms are to be accepted as correct. They, however, are liable to conceal from the reader the fact that Confucius spoke of different shades or phases of his ideal in all these different cases. Mr. Dawson has consequently not observed this fact. His attention was not duly attracted to the Confucian ideal and he only treated it casually. The doctrines of Confucius are remarkable in that they lay emphasis on the concordance between Heaven and man. On this concordance rests the system of his ethical and political doctrines, and the very key-note to this concordance is to be found in his ideal, i.e. "*jen*." "*Jen*" is primarily the principle of love or benevolence. Benevolence is the basic virtue of Heaven and is implanted in human nature. It becomes perfect virtue in man through an *a posteriori* realization, and in this stage of perfect realization man becomes one with Heaven in virtue. This idea forms a necessary and sufficient condition for a comprehension of the true meaning of the Confucian doctrines. In close relation with "*jen*" there is another principle, called "*yi*" in Chinese, which Dr. Legge has translated by the English term "righteousness." This principle is often spoken of by Confucius and plays a very prominent part in

the doctrines of Mencius. It is the principle regulating human conduct under the different conditions of life. It is the principle which marks a sharp distinction between the Confucian principle of love and the theory of communistic love propounded by Micius. When a man confronts two incompatible courses of conduct and is obliged to sacrifice one for the sake of the other, it is this principle which strongly compels him to adhere to that course of conduct with which the welfare and interest of a higher entity are concerned. It is this principle that makes up the strong and inflexible character of man. All these shades of the principle have become obscured through translation, so that they do not awaken the present author to a proper understanding of the principle. The author often uses the expression "art of living" (pp. 6–12, etc.), and by its use he intends to indicate his opinion that the Confucian ethics form a doctrine of purposive response, of the adaptation of means to ends, etc. This way of looking at the Confucian ethics seems to represent it as a rather mechanical method of living — a defect from which later Confucianism was not always free. As taught by Confucius and Mencius, however, it was not a mechanical method of living. Here the principle of "*yi*," or righteousness, as Dr. Legge puts it, comes into play. It enables man to adapt himself to a course of conduct appropriate to the circumstances in which he is situated. While the principle of "*jen*" is the principle of uniformity, that of "*yi*" is the principle of diversity. Through different ways of adaptation or response under different conditions, man is enabled to attain the highest ideal, i.e., the perfect realization of virtue. The present author is undoubtedly handicapped by his dependence on translations, and has consequently failed to arrive at a proper appreciation of these points.

What is most conspicuous in the book is the author's view that Confucius did not teach a religion (Introduction, p. i). The reviewer is delighted to find an Occidental scholar who has come to this view. Though based on profound religious convictions, the doctrines of Confucius are strictly ethical and political, as the author clearly states. Most Occidental scholars confuse what the reviewer designates "pre-Confucian thought" with the doctrines of Confucius himself, and representing both indiscriminately by the term Confucianism, regard the latter as a system of religion. That the present author explicitly declares the doctrines of Confucius to be ethical and political is quite remarkable in face of the fact of his being a member of the Confucian Society in China and of his relation with Dr. Ch'en Huan Chang. The Society was started soon

after the establishment of the Republic by Dr. Ch'en, a Chinese scholar who received the degree of Ph.D. at Columbia University. The Society intended to represent the doctrines of Confucius as a religion and to have them established as the State religion of China. The movement which was organized for the purpose called forth a reactionary movement among Chinese Christians, Buddhists, and others. At last a presidential mandate was issued, in which President Yuan Shi K'ai explicitly stated that the Republic should have no State religion and that the doctrines of Confucius should be respected as formerly in the light of ethical and political precepts. To interpret the doctrines of Confucius as a system of religion is not permissible, however divergent the interpretations of Confucianism by later Chinese or Japanese scholars may be.

Another good feature of the book is that it gives a clear statement of the fact that Confucius praised above all other attitudes of mind that which considers only the thing to be done, not the reward for it (p. 69). In an apparent contradiction with this stands the author's statement to the effect that Confucius does not deem an act good or bad according as the motive is virtuous or evil, but that an act is to be judged by its effect and a motive by its result (p. 45). According to the former view, the Confucian ethics would seem to be strict rigorism, while according to the latter, it would seem to be utilitarian. This point would have been cleared up, if the author had referred to the contrast between the principles of "*jen*" and "*yi*." As the principle of love or benevolence, "*jen*" is utilitarian, because it makes universal realization and the consequent welfare of the people the ultimate aim of the superior man. As the principle of righteousness, "*yi*" commands that the first consideration of the superior man should be the following of the right path, independent of any motive of personal gain, profit, or interest. The latter emphasizes the execution of duty out of the pure, disinterested motive of complying with the command of duty. The following of the right path is to be accompanied by the resultant welfare of the higher entity, with which the personal interest of the actor is closely interwoven. The superior man, however, does not follow the right path with his own private interest in view. He who does so is the "mean man" (p. 71). When, however, the following of the right path happens to bring upon him a calamity or mishap, the superior man does not fail to ponder over the matter. It may be due to some shortcoming on his part or to causes beyond his control. If he finds fault with himself, the superior man hastens to "rectify the purpose," while if he be convinced that the calamity is not due to

any shortcoming on his part, the superior man acquiesces in what he deems the decree of Heaven. The fact that Confucius recognized one's virtue even in one's faults (see the quotation on p. 75, which is erroneously explained as bearing on righteousness) speaks very strongly in favor of the view that Confucius laid greater stress on motives than on results. The principle of righteousness is spoken of in sharp contrast with personal profit or gain, as is shown by the quotation on p. 71.

Among the author's comments on the Confucian conception of Heaven those which pertain to the idea of a personal God (p. 293) are worthy of special mention. On account of the lack of materials available for the author in the form of translations, he was not able to explain by quotations the various ideas which enter in the formation of the idea of a personal God. It is surprising that he has overlooked the theory of the heavenly investiture of the sovereign, which is so prominent in the Books of Poetry and of History and in the Works of Mencius. This theory has been the reason for the revolutionary dynastic changes which have been so frequent in China. The Confucian theory of Providence, which the author explains on p. 288, is incomplete without a reference to this doctrine. The author states Confucius's views on prayer very well (p. 287), when he says that Confucius commended and practised prayer continually offered by means of a virtuous and useful life. In other words, Confucius rejected prayer in the usual sense of the term. He could not have believed in oracles, though the author tries to show us that he did.

The theory of "beneficent government" in contra-distinction to military rule, which the author explains in Chapter V, is of special interest to the Occidental reader. This kind of government, which Confucianism regarded as the ideal one, is a combination of communistic and individualistic principles, as the author eloquently explains. Most of the matters which he discusses in this connection can only be properly understood by a reference to the ancient systems of land-tenure and the village-community, with which these matters were closely interwoven. The writer might well have referred to Dr. Ch'en's *Economic Principles of the Confucian School*, but perhaps the exigencies of space prevented him from doing so.

The author's comments and quotations concerning the family as the foundation of society and its proper regulation as the basis for government (p. 173) and of military equipment (p. 207) will be especially interesting to the American reader. The doctrine of obedience based on love and respect, which plays so great a

part in the Confucian views of the relations of men as members of a family or of a State, will be of value to the citizens of America, where we hear so much of a lack of obedience and respect. One of the sayings of Confucius to the effect that "to lead an uneducated people to war is to throw them away" (p. 207) will be a good lesson both to the advocates of preparedness and to the pacifists.

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St. Paul and Christianity. Arthur C. Headlam, D.D. John Murray. 1913. Pp. xv, 214. *5s.*

The author of this book tells us that his purpose is "to examine the opinions of St. Paul in relation to certain salient points in his teaching, to discuss the genesis of those opinions, and to investigate the relation of his thought to contemporary Christian teaching" (p. 2); but he makes no attempt to present the Apostle's thought in complete or systematic form. With a few rather unimportant reservations, Dr. Headlam accepts as genuine the thirteen Epistles traditionally ascribed to Paul, though he admits that most critical scholars would not agree with him in this wholesale acceptance of the Pauline corpus. The Book of Acts he uses as a wholly veracious account of what was done and believed by the early Christians.

Christian teaching, as Dr. Headlam presents it, is a thoroughly consistent body of doctrine. One might indeed say that it is like a fabric of uniform texture and one color. What Jesus taught Paul received, and in general the Apostolic Church agreed with Paul; and the teachings of the Christian Church are "the development of the principles which Christ taught" (p. 93). With this complacent and easy-going view of Christian doctrine the twentieth-century believer would have to accept with hearty approval every part of the traditional theology on the ground that the whole system bears the sanction of the mind of Christ. Fortunately, however, an impartial study of Christian origins shows beyond the possibility of denial that variety rather than uniformity was the outstanding characteristic of the apostolic age, and saves us from the fatal error of finding the articles of the historic creeds in the teaching of Jesus and Paul.

Dr. Headlam rightly emphasizes the significance of Paul's personal religious experience, but he greatly underestimates the originality of the apostle. For example, we are told that the christology of the

Pauline Epistles is not the product of Paul's mind, but that it goes back to the teaching of Christ, to the expectations of the Jews, and to the memories of the earliest disciples (p. 69 f.). This judgment comes dangerously near containing the maximum of error in the minimum of space. Paul's influence on Christian thought is traced to two sources — his rabbinical training and the reality of his Christianity. The exegesis and theological categories of the Jewish schools are present in the apostle's letters because they belonged to his *Weltanschauung*, but they are by no means the heart of Paulinism. It was Paul's personal religious experience that shaped his thinking and gave vitality to his message. This truth we cannot easily over-emphasize, and in so far as Dr. Headlam's conservative treatment of Paul and Christianity contributes to this end it is to be commended.

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The Books of the Apocrypha. Their Origin, Teaching, and Contents. W. O. E. Oesterley. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1914. Pp. 554. $3.00.

The purpose of this book is to encourage the reading of the Apocrypha, and to give the information needed to make the reading intelligent. Part I, the Prolegomena, treats, with undue repetitions, of such subjects as Greek influence on Judaism and its literature, the work of the scribes, their editing of the canon and their writing of other books, the character of the Pharisaic and Sadducean parties, and the movement, in part distinct from both, which expressed itself in the apocalypses. Part II is Introduction proper, and discusses the usual problems of the date, authorship, composition, contents, and purpose of the books of our English Apocrypha.

Whether the task itself which the author thus sets himself is well defined is a question. From the historian's point of view the Apocrypha is almost — though not quite — an accidental selection from the extra-canonical literature of Judaism. That these books passed over from the Greek Old Testament to the Old Latin, and so to the Vulgate, indicates something as to their age and currency and influence; but there are other books, such as Enoch, the Psalms of Solomon, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, the Apocalypse of Baruch, IV Maccabees, which are more important to the New Testament student than some of the books of the Apocrypha. It is desirable that these also should be accessible and their reading

encouraged. Such books are touched upon briefly and superficially in the Prolegomena of the present work. All the more ought a clear account to be given of the origin of the Apocrypha as a collection, and of its place and use in the Christian church, Catholic and Protestant. This we miss in the present work.

Accepting, however, the writer's limitation of his task, the question remains as to the quality of the performance. One cannot escape the impression that this large and rather expensive book has been hastily put together. The author can hardly have read it through in its present form. On page 83 f., for example, we read: "Jewish belief on this subject [immortality] has already been dealt with in Part I, chap. ix, f." The reference is to a much later passage, chap. xii, pp. 288 ff. The higher critic will infer that pages 80–86 were once a part of the treatment of the Book of Wisdom, in Part II.

More serious are certain inconsistencies in the treatment of Sadduceeism and the Book of Sirach. The most distinctive feature of Oesterley's book is his acceptance in large measure of the views of Leszynsky's *Die Sadduzäer*, 1912. On the basis of this treatment he concludes that the original mark of the Sadducee was a conservative adherence to the written Law, and the rejection of the authority of the oral traditions of the Pharisees. Sadduceeism was not primarily a political party, and was not, in general, hellenizing or worldly and irreligious in its tendency. It was the party of "the Torah as traditionally interpreted"; this meant that Sadduceeism gained a partial triumph, and that Rabbinical Judaism was a synthesis of Pharisaic and Sadducean elements. Another main distinction of the Sadducees was their expectation of a Messiah of priestly instead of Davidic descent. Further, they urged a solar against the Pharisaic lunar calendar. They rejected the doctrine of resurrection, but only as an unwarranted addition to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which they accepted from Hellenism. They did not deny angels, since that would be to depart from the Pentateuch, but only the theory that the pious dead became angels. Yet they were the party of enlightenment, and in some undefined sense not inconsistent with their fundamental loyalty to the Law, they were friendly to Hellenistic culture.

In spite of this conception of the Sadducees Oesterley still holds the usual view that Jesus son of Sirach, before Sadduceeism proper, was a man of the Sadducean tendency, and that I Maccabees is a Sadducean history. But Leszynsky is followed in ascribing other books to the same party—Enoch 72–82, and possibly other parts of that apocalypse; the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, because

of its Levitical Messiah, "written by a Sadducee for the purpose of making peace with the Pharisees"; the Book of Jubilees, because of its strict legalism. Leszynsky is not followed in his ascription of the Assumption of Moses to the Sadducees. Tobit is regarded as a mixture of the three tendencies, Pharisaic, Sadducean, and Apocalyptic.

These positions, if not hastily adopted, are certainly insufficiently argued, and are not carried through consistently. That Sirach is Sadducean in character is uniformly affirmed; but Sirach "combated the rising influence of Greek thought and culture" (p. 327), whereas the Sadducees and their forebears in pre-Maccabean times were friendly to Hellenistic culture even to the point of disloyalty to their nation and religion (pp. 154–156). Again we read of Sirach in one place that "there is no mention of angels or demons in the book" (p. 340); in another that "in two passages there is a distinct mention of angels, *viz.* 42 16 (17), 43 26" (p. 300). Both of these contradictory observations are made to prove the Sadducean character of Sirach. So as to a future life, we are told of his "dreamy belief or non-belief," seen in such passages as 10 4, 38 16–23, and that no passages occur "which show the slightest advance on the teaching which these contain" (p. 337); while elsewhere it is inferred from 22 11, 30 17, etc. "that the annihilation of the spirit as well as the body is evidently not contemplated" (p. 288). Again these divergent views are both declared to be Sadducean.

These obvious inconsistencies appear to be due to the partial adoption of Leszynsky's position, and to the failure to eliminate survivals of the influence of Cowley, from whose article in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* Oesterley concludes, in his *Ecclesiasticus* (Cambridge Bible, p. xxvi f.), that the Zadokites are to be distinguished as the conservative priestly party from the Sadducees, the party of sympathizers with foreign ideas, who rejected distinctively Jewish beliefs. The Sadducees cannot have been both the party of conservative adherence to the Law and the party represented by the extreme Hellenizers of the pre-Maccabean days. Oesterley seems to waver between these two definitions, neither of which, perhaps, is quite correct, certainly neither a correct characterization of the Book of Sirach. In general he puts too much emphasis on the question which of the several books is Pharisaic and which Sadducean; though it is occasionally pointed out that a writer may very well be neither the one nor the other.

The effort to distinguish foreign elements from native Jewish developments in the religion of these books, to discover Persian

influence on the one side and Greek on the other, might well have been more thorough. The striking fact about the Judaism of this period is that it is everywhere in contact with Greek culture, differently in Palestine and in the Dispersion, differently in different times and circumstances; maintaining itself against Hellenism by various kinds of exclusiveness or revolt, spiritual or physical; and again assimilating Hellenistic ideas in various manners and measures. But in Mr. Oesterley's book we miss a clear and decisive grasp of this central problem. His treatment, for example, of the doctrine of a future life is not illuminating, although it is a subject in regard to which the fundamental differences between Greek and Hebrew ways of thinking and also their interactions are relatively easy to trace. The Hebrew mind is represented as first coming, under Greek influence, to such a belief in immortality of the soul as is expressed in Enoch 102–104, and then as being led logically forward "to the fuller doctrine of the resurrection of the body" (pp. 107–109). Was Enoch 103, then, written before Daniel 12? We even read of "the doctrine of resurrection for which Judaism was indebted to Hellenism" (p. 39). The discussion of the Book of Wisdom also (pp. 80–87, 298–300, 470 ff.) is deficient in insight and discrimination as to the relation between Jewish and Hellenic modes of thought.

There is, as every one knows, one book with which all other books on the Judaism of the time of Christ must be compared, if their existence is to be justified—Schürer's *History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*. This discusses substantially all the subjects treated by Oesterley and others no less important. Besides, and first of all, it is a detailed history of Palestine from 175 B.C. to 135 A.D. Its five volumes in English cost but little more than twice as much as the book before us, and contain four or five times as many words, and, let us say, forty or fifty times as much information. It is true that the English Schürer is not from the last edition, and also that the translation of the first two volumes is marred by numerous errors. Nevertheless, as it stands, it is far better than any other work in English on the history, the inner life, and the literature of the Judaism of this period. One who has Schürer will not need Oesterley.

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THE IDEALISTIC REACTION AGAINST SCIENCE. Professor ALIOTTA, Royal University of Padua. Translated by Agnes McCaskill. Macmillan & Co. 1914. Pp. xxii, 483. $3.00.

The author tells us that "this work must be regarded as a new edition rather than a mere translation" of his book, *La Reazione idealistica contro la scienza*, published in Italy in 1912, since he has "subjected the whole of it to a process of revision with a view to improving it and adapting it to the British public." A more descriptive title for the book would be "The Reaction against Intellectualism." Even this title suggests a scope narrower than that which the book really has. It is in fact a critical summary of present tendencies in philosophy and in science, with special reference to the attacks upon the traditional intellectualism. These attacks have emanated from a variety of sources, and give to the thought of the present a general and distinctive character. It is not against the ideal of exact science merely that this movement is directed, but against philosophical rationalism as well; and idealism is by no means the only, or even the chief factor in this movement. The author defines intellectualism as follows: "By the term 'intellectualism,' taken in the widest sense of the word, we shall understand those epistemological systems which assign an autonomous value to the cognitive function." The reaction to intellectualism comprises all those views which would "make the value of science and of knowledge in general depend upon the ends of other functions of the mind, and rank will and imagination above intellect." As to the author himself, he exemplifies a reaction against this reaction. So far as this leading issue is concerned, he sides with intellectualism, and is therefore opposed to what he regards as the "predominant characteristic" of contemporary philosophy.

Anti-intellectualism first becomes a conscious motive among the pragmatists and Bergsonians. The fundamental error which Bergson commits is his attempt to derive intelligence from something else, such as æsthetic or practical activity. The world of the intellect, says Professor Aliotta, is an anomaly either from the standpoint of æstheticism or from that of moralism. The only way to account for it is to regard it as original and irreducible. But it is more than that; it is the indispensable ground of any world. Pragmatism, as exemplified by James and Dewey, does not, according to our author, succeed in getting away from those appeals to fact and to the principle of contradiction which have always been distinctive

of the cognitive as opposed to the practical faculties. The voluntaristic idealists, or "absolute pragmatists," as Professor Royce proposes to call them, are discussed in the present book under the somewhat misleading title, "The Philosophy of Values and the Historic Method." The essential contention of this group of thinkers is that such practical categories as "ought" or "ideal," are prior to the category of existence owing to the normative or purposive character of the act of judgment. Professor Aliotta argues both for the possibility of knowing existence without the act of judgment, and for a realistic interpretation of judgment itself. The philosophy of Royce, in which "the reaction from intellectualism reaches its speculative acme," is evidently greatly admired by the author; but he rejects it, not only on account of its voluntarism but on account of its pantheistic inclusion of the finite consciousness within the Divine Mind.

So far the author has dealt with those assaults upon the intellect that have emanated from philosophical sources. In Part II he deals with similar tendencies in science; in particular with the disposition among scientists to regard the logical and mathematical apparatus with which they work as conventional and arbitrary. It is not mere utility that dictates the formal factor in science, so our author contends, but the independent and incontrovertible motive of rationality. Science, in so far as it brings facts under laws and systems, partially achieves that which philosophy carries to completion — the discovery, namely, of that rational order which is "the necessary postulate of all knowledge." Nevertheless Professor Aliotta dissents from the "logical realists," like Mr. Russell, who would give a thoroughly objective status to the truths of the intellect. He very properly contends that a logical realism implies the "external" theory of relations, according to which relations are distinct and separable entities capable of doing their own relating. But this view lacks, he thinks, that "synthetic principle," "that organic unity of thought and reality which alone can render knowledge intelligible." In short, Professor Aliotta belongs to that numerous group of thinkers who regard the unity of the conscious self as more "intelligible" than the unity composed by two terms and a relation; and who propose, therefore, to explain all order and connection in the world by attributing it to "thought."

In this fundamental respect the author is unmistakably an idealist. But he terms his philosophy "a form of spiritualistic realism," because of his insistence upon the independence both of nature on the mind of man, and of the human mind on that of God. This

resembles the view which has been known in England and America as "Personal Idealism," and is represented by Howison, Sturt, and others. It also has important points of resemblance to the pluralism of Leibniz, and to the more recent pluralism of James Ward. All of these philosophies would agree with Professor Aliotta's fundamental contention that "we have immediate assurance of our subjective life, an assurance which cannot be shaken by sceptical doubt." All would agree that this individual and internal subjectivity must ever remain external to any other subject, and so be incapable of being absorbed in any one absolute mind.

The most prominent note in the present book is its insistence upon the priority of thought over will. When we know, says our author, "the mind recognizes objects and relations whose existence does not depend at all upon its volition." He also concedes that in all knowledge there is an acknowledgment of the objects' independence. He hastens to add that this does not imply their independence of all consciousness but only of the individual consciousness. So our author attempts that compromise between realism and subjectivism which is characteristic of those who style themselves "objective idealists." But he attempts it in a novel manner. Instead of supposing that in knowledge the mind divests itself of its individuality, and unites itself with an absolute mind which creates and constitutes its object, he supposes that the mind recognizes as objective and independent a certain set of laws and categories which are the *end* or *goal* of nature. The mind is justified in imposing its own necessities of thought upon nature, because these necessities, and the mind which recognizes them, are the "end towards which the becoming of things tends." To a logical realist all of this elaborate speculation is gratuitous. The mind does not first give expression to certain ideals of rationality that spring from within, and then, discovering the miracle that nature also respects these ideals, solemnly conclude that there must be some complicity on the part of nature. The logical realist finds the laws and categories in nature to start with; and since they never belonged to the mind, the fact that nature obeys them does not prove any determination of nature by mind.

This book has many merits. Its style is exceptionally good, and the thought is clear. The author's own view is not wholly convincing, and does not always strike the reader as rigorous in its reasoning. It is eclectic rather than radical and clean cut. But as an exposition of the variety of contemporary philosophies it is of distinguished excellence. There is no other book on present

tendencies so cosmopolitan in its scope and so scrupulously fair in its representation of conflicting views.

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Henri Bergson: A Study in Radical Evolution. Emil Carl Wilm, Ph.D., LL.D. Sturgis & Walton Co., New York. 1914. Pp. xviii, 193.

Of its kind this is an excellent little book. Professor Wilm has successfully achieved, I should say, the task which he has set himself, viz., to give "a brief and comparatively non-technical statement of Bergson's philosophy which shall be intelligible to the general reader who wishes to know something of this much-talked-of philosopher" (Preface, p. xi). It is always hard for a professor to write, and for another professor to judge, a book intended for a non-professorial audience; but among popular expositions of Bergson I should rank this book by the side of Dr. Wildon Carr's well-known little volume. Where Dr. Carr, however, writes with the enthusiastic zeal of a prophet, Professor Wilm writes with a calm detachment which makes for perspective and critical balance. He has a deft touch in exposition, and the happy knack of apposite quotation both from philosophy and poetry. Nothing could be more felicitous than the illustration of Bergson's intuition from Browning's *Paracelsus* (p. 80).

The book consists of an introductory section, followed by twelve expository and four critical sections. The expository sections deal with such topics as Change and Duration, Bergson's criticism of the Intellect at work in the conceptual analyses of Psychology and Physics, Intuition as the true method of Metaphysics, Evolution and Creation, Mechanism and Design, Freedom. That hardly any use should have been made of Bergson's most technical work, *Matière et Mémoire*, is due, no doubt, to the non-technical aim of the book. Otherwise the exposition is, within its self-imposed limits, accurate. There is only one point on which I am tempted to dissent strongly from Professor Wilm's interpretation. It appears to me that he altogether overshoots the mark when, in discussing Bergson's account of intuition as intellectual sympathy, as a viewing of the object "from within" instead of "from without," he suggests that Bergson's position is "distinctly reminiscent" of that of Leibniz's Monadology (p. 72). The pluralism of discrete, self-contained monads is as foreign, I should say, to the monism of Bergson's *élan vital*, as the suggestion that Bergson's intuition reflects the inner life of objects in the same way in which each Leibnizian monad

reflects the entire world because it is the world in miniature. There are no doubt ambiguous passages in Bergson which *prima facie* justify Professor Wilm's statement that "intuition appears to involve an ascription to nature of a psychical life similar to our own" (p. 71). But when one follows the main drift of Bergson's thought, it is clearly seen to be always focussed on the difference between the "outside" view of the intellect, which decomposes the continuous and ever-changing flux of creative life into a rigid pattern of static concepts, and the "inside" view of intuition, which experiences (and lives) life directly as it really is. The problem is everywhere to intuit the *élan vital*. The distinction of self and object-other-than-self is here strictly irrelevant. When it is said that intuition is most easily practised on "one's own" inner life, the meaning is, I take it, that the inadequacy of concepts is most easily realized in Psychology. But once it has been seen there, one's eyes are opened to it everywhere. There is now no question of reflecting within the inner life of one's own self the inner life of some object other than one's self, for such a statement still retains the fatal distinctions proper to the intellect. Emancipated from the intellect, experience coincides again with the cosmic *élan vital* itself, for which, as such, there is no self and no not-self, no inner and no outer.

Professor Wilm, by the way, is quite right in holding that James misinterpreted Bergson in claiming him as a fellow-apostle of "sensation, that flesh-bound thing which rationalism has always loaded with abuse." The most interesting point in the critical sections is, to my mind, the enquiry how far Bergson's philosophy might supply the framework for "a truly modern theology." I do not myself discover in Bergson's view of evolution any provision for creative novelties which can fairly be said to be "ideally demanded" (p. 143). Indeed, the absence of any "ideal demands" is for me precisely the chief defect of Bergson's conception of creation. But Professor Wilm's discussion of Death and Immortality in section xvii seems to me sane and frank.

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé.

Harvard University.

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